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If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every
problem as a nail.
—Abraham Maslow1
Henry Ward Beecher once observed, “Laws and institutions
are constantly tending to gravitate. Like clocks, they must be
occasionally cleansed, and wound up, and set to true time.”2 As
law, societies, and governments evolve, challenging transitional
periods inevitably arise, requiring reexamination of the bedrock
upon which a system was founded.
Dispute resolution systems exhibit a similar phenomenon.
As a system develops and undergoes fundamental growth, reconsideration of its efficacy can promote both the integrity and
the legitimacy of the system to ensure it provides appropriate
services to its stakeholders.3 The resolution of international investment disputes is a salient example of this maxim.
International investment law has experienced significant
growth. Within the last two decades, the number of interna1. See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 15–16
(1996).
2. HENRY WARD BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (Sheldon & Co. 1866)
(1858).
3. The birth and growth of the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” movement—with its focus on the multi-door courthouse and development of nontraditional dispute resolution mechanisms—is an example of this phenomenon. See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 12–
62 (3d ed. 2005); see also Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68
A.B.A. J. 274, 276–77 (1982) (discussing developments in arbitration and other
alternatives to court); Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70
F.R.D. 111, 111–12 (1976) (noting that increased pressure on the court system
would likely prompt the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); cf.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073–75 (1984) (tracing
the development of alternative dispute resolution while questioning the value
of settlement). The area continues to evolve. See Christopher Honeyman &
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Introduction to THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 1, 2 (Andrea Kupfer
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATOR’S
FIELDBOOK] (considering dispute resolution from an interdisciplinary perspective); INST. ON CONFLICT RESOL. & SOC’Y OF PROF’LS IN DISPUTE RESOL., DESIGNING INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: GUIDELINES FOR
PRACTITIONERS AND DECISION MAKERS IN ORGANIZATIONS (2001), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&
context=icrpubs (suggesting that, as the process of evaluating dispute resolution evolves, there is an increased emphasis on creating integrated conflict
management systems); James R. Coben, Intentional Conversations About the
Globalization of ADR, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 217, 222 (2006) (referring to scholarship that suggests a need to reconsider conflict management in
light of the evolution of dispute systems).
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tional investment treaties, which provide foreign investors with
substantive rights and procedural remedies, has surged to
nearly 2500.4 Meanwhile, foreign investment spiked to levels
over $1 trillion,5 and foreign investors have brought vital capital and know-how to countries in need of basic infrastructure
like clean water, paved roads, electricity, and telecommunications.6 While these investments can benefit both investors and
4. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], BILATERAL INTREATIES IN THE MID-1990S at 10, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7,
U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998) [hereinafter UNCTAD, BITs] (observing the
surge in the number of investment treaties during the 1990s); UNCTAD, Developments in International Investment Agreements in 2005, 2, IIA MONITOR,
No. 2 2006, at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/7, http://www
.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20067_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements] (finding that, by the end of 2005, there were
2495 bilateral investment treaties); see also Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct
Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 338 (2007) (explaining that the
number of investment treaties has tripled in the past two decades). But see
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
PERSPECTIVES: 2006, at 144 (2006) (suggesting that the number of international investment agreements actually in force and effect is around seventeen
hundred); UNCTAD, The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs), IIA MONITOR, No. 3 2006, at 1, 2–3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en
.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Entry into Force] (acknowledging that, out of the
2495 investment treaties in existence at the end of 2005, only 75.8% had entered into force).
5. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT & COLUMBIA PROGRAM ON INT’L
INV., WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO 2010: BOOM OR BACKLASH? 6 (Laza
Kekic & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2006), available at http://www.cpii.columbia
.edu/pubs/documents/WIP_to_2010_SPECIAL_EDITION.pdf
[hereinafter
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS] (indicating that levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2006 are approximately $1165 billion and expected to grow
to $1407.3 billion by 2010); Franck, supra note 4, at 338 (indicating that FDI
surged from $200 billion in 1990 to over $1 trillion in 2000). But see UNCTAD,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006 at xvii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2006,
U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.11 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
wir2006_en.pdf (suggesting that the level of FDI in 2005 was $916 billion, but
noting that the peak in 2000 was $1.4 trillion). FDI in member states of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reached
$622 billion in 2005, which was a twenty-seven percent increase since 2004.
OECD, supra note 4, at 15.
6. Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C.
DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 48–49 (2005); see also PAUL E. COMEAUX & N.
STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xvii, xxv (1997) (discussing the vital contributions made by
foreign investment, including important contributions for local entrepreneurs,
the provision of an integrated package of financial backing and skills, the introduction of competitive enterprises, the adoption of new management techVESTMENT
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host states, there are latent tensions between the two groups
when their interests diverge. When this unaddressed tension
encounters an appropriate catalyst, disputes can result.7
Unsurprisingly, where conflict has festered, foreign investors have used their new treaty rights to bring claims against
host governments. Perhaps less expected, however, is the number and magnitude of disputes arising under investment treaties.8 Some have referred to this as a “litigation explosion”9
where billions of dollars and sovereignty are at stake.10
niques, and the catalyst for new opportunities).
7. See infra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (discussing examples of
investment treaty disputes).
8. Compare K. Scott Gudgeon, Avoidance and Settlement of International
Investment Disputes, 78 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 38, 49 (1984) (“I expect that
the BIT arbitration feature, even if it may not lead to a surge of business for
arbitral fora, will assist investors in minimizing risks . . . [and] avoiding disputes . . . .”), with George M. von Mehren et al., Navigating Through InvestorState Arbitrations—An Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, DISP.
RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2004, at 69, 76 (suggesting that the “number of global investors seeking to recoup losses through BIT arbitrations will increase in the
coming years”).
9. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT
TREATIES: A REVIEW at 4–6, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, U.N. Sales
No. E.06.II.D.1 (2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
iteiit20054_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, DISPUTES]; UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, IIA MONITOR, No. 2 2005, at
1, 1–3, 13–15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1, http://www.unctad
.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/webiteiit20051_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Recent Developments]; Jeswald W. Salacuse, Explanations for the Increased Recourse to Treaty-Based Investment Dispute Settlement: Resolving the Struggle
of Life Against Form?, in COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (Karl P. Sauvant ed., forthcoming 2007); see also Andrea
Kupfer Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution Is Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 119
(noting an “explosion” of international trials to resolve disputes that formerly
would have been resolved through diplomacy); Gus Van Harten & Martin
Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 124 & n.11 (2006) (referring to the growth of investment treaty arbitration and noting that “ICSID arbitration is only part of
the explosion”).
10. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Treaty Disputes: Arbitration Scorecard,
FOCUS EUR., Summer 2007, at 22, 22–27, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?hubtype=Inside&id=1180947929487 (describing twenty-five cases where the amount in controversy is over $1 billion per case and
the total amount in dispute is over $103.77 billion); Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 449, 452 (2007) (suggesting that there were at
least thirty-four investment treaty claims against Argentina, which also defaulted on government debt in the order of $80 billion); PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA’S THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY: THE RECORD OF NAFTA
CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES 1994–2005, at vii–xxi (2005), http://www
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The escalation in the availability and use of the treatybased dispute resolution process has led to a teething period.
The boundaries of states’ previously untested international law
obligations are being sketched, and parties and nonparties
have cheered and jeered the efficacy, efficiency, and fairness of
the current system for resolving investment treaty disputes.11
In the United States, for example, there is an ongoing debate
about the proper terms for investment treaties and the renewal
of the Trade Promotion Authority Act.12
With its fundamental growth13—and divergent views as to
its success—the process of resolving investment treaty disputes
.citizen.org/documents/Chapter%2011%20Report%20Final.pdf (detailing the
rights of foreign investors to seek enforcement from governments under the
North American Free Trade Agreement). But see W. Michael Reisman, Reflections on Economic Development, National Sovereignty and International Arbitration 16–20 (Apr. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Bogota.4.13.06.pdf ) (observing that the consent to arbitration is itself an exercise of sovereignty, suggesting that arbitral
tribunals strictly apply the law, and commenting that countries can then take
steps to accommodate concerns about sovereignty through the normal political
process).
11. Compare Charles H. Brower, II, Structure Legitimacy and NAFTA’s
Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 49–51, 77–81 (2003) (expressing concerns about the legitimacy of resolving investment disputes under
NAFTA), Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1582–83 (2005) (expressing concerns about the legitimacy of resolution of investment treaty disputes generally), and Carlos G.
Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America,
and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301,
338–46, 352–56 (2004) (exploring procedural deficiencies and costs of investorstate arbitration), with Judith A.E. Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to Be
Addressed or a Fact of Life?, 2 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 12, 15 (2005) (suggesting that concerns with the current arbitration system will be addressed
over time), and Daniel M. Price, Chapter 11—Private Party vs. Government,
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 107, 114 (2000) (suggesting that the system can handle some inconsistency and suggesting “fears about overreaching [arbitral] panels are quite premature”).
12. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3801–13 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); see Lee Hudson Teslik, Fast-Track
Trade Promotion Authority and Its Impact on U.S. Trade Policy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, June 25, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13663/
fasttrack_trade_promotion_authority_and_its_impact_on_us_trade_policy.htm
(discussing the debate about the renewal of Trade Promotion Authority Act).
13. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=969257 (discussing the purported increase in the rise of investment treaty arbitration and offering data that demonstrate a marked increase
in the number of arbitration awards).
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is at a critical historical juncture that requires reexamination
of its foundations. Given that treaties provide a set of legal
rights and parties can now bargain with some information
about where the shadow of the law may fall, it is time to think
strategically about how to manage conflict effectively.
In an effort to consider how best to examine the system’s
efficacy to promote its long-term integrity, this Article considers two discrete areas—investment treaties and Dispute Systems Design—to suggest how they might inform each other.14
Dispute Systems Design is not a form of dispute resolution or a
type of “alternative dispute resolution.” Rather it is a process of
analyzing existing patterns of disputing, creating new
processes, and implementing and testing the new design in order to create a process that effectively and efficiently resolves
disputes.15 The central question this Article addresses is: Can
and should Dispute Systems Design play a role in developing
the processes for resolving investment treaty-related conflict?
As this is the first scholarship to consider this intersection,
the issues raised in this Article are tentative and calculated to
encourage more systematic analysis.16 Part I introduces basic
concepts related to investment treaties. Part II outlines the
more general context of conflict resolution theory and Dispute
Systems Design principles. Part III of the Article then demonstrates how these related—but thus far distinct—areas might
inform each other. It explores the potential application of Dispute Systems Design principles to investment conflict and then,
in Part IV, considers the costs and benefits of such an approach. Part IV also identifies key issues for this integration
and recommends exploration of critical questions such as the
identification of organizing principles for dispute resolution
processes.

14. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Public and Private International Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 438, 451 (Michael
L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (discussing the value of interdisciplinary discussions and cross-fertilization between the international law and
dispute resolution disciplines).
15. At its core, Dispute Systems Design is a systematic process of choosing
a dispute resolution methodology. See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying
text for a detailed definition and discussion of Dispute Systems Design.
16. There is scholarship that considers aspects of dispute resolution, such
as improvements to investment treaty arbitration rules and nonbinding dispute resolution processes. This literature is an important contribution, but it
has not yet taken a systematic approach to diagnosing and managing conflict.
See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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The Article concludes that this new area of scholarship
should play a role in the effective and efficient management of
investment treaty conflict. It then considers the next steps for
implementing and diffusing Dispute Systems Design to develop
processes to manage investment treaty conflict. Without a considered assessment and development of dispute resolution
processes, the legitimacy of existing systems will continue to be
questioned, and dispute resolution mechanisms might fail to
harness the positive aspects of conflict while minimizing the
negative ones. With Dispute Systems Design, stakeholders will
be in a better position to maximize satisfaction and legitimacy
of the dispute resolution process.
I. FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INVESTMENT TREATIES
A. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Foreign investment has a critical impact on the world
economy and development.17 In previous decades, foreign investment involved billions of dollars annually, and current projections suggest that investment inflows will be close to $1.5
trillion by 2010.18
While its definition is a subject of debate,19 foreign investment archetypically involves a large infrastructure project. It
17. See R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES,
MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 2–7 (2005); II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 435–37 (1995).
18. WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS, supra note 5, at 6.
19. Professor Sornarajah defines foreign investment as “the transfer of
tangible or intangible assets from one country into another for the purpose of
use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the
owner of the assets.” M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 4 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 6, at xix–xx (“Foreign direct investment refers to direct control of either assets or an enterprise in a foreign country through ownership of a substantial portion of the assets or enterprise.”).
There is a debate about the definition of investment. Some scholars distinguish among direct investment projects where investors control the
project’s development, portfolio investments that involve buying shares in the
company, and cross-border trade in goods and services; others disagree with
this approach. See SORNARAJAH, supra, at 4–8; Alfred Escher, Current Developments, Legal Challenges, and Definition of FDI, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3, 20–25 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds.,
1999) (considering the broad and narrow definitions of FDI and observing that
the International Monetary Fund defines investment as “acquir[ing] a lasting
interest in an enterprise operating in an economy”); see also II ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (1995) (characterizing foreign investment
as “the transfer of funds or materials from one country (called the capital ex-
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might range from something as basic as the construction of a
road, the financing and development of a power plant, or the
development of telecommunications capacity.20 Investment can
be broader than this, however. Foreign investment also might
involve intellectual property rights21 or other types of vital
commercial activity.22 These basic investments can have profound effects on the alleviation of global poverty and the promotion of economic opportunities.23
porting country) to another country (called the host country) to be used in the
conduct of an enterprise in that country in return for a direct or indirect participation in the earnings of the enterprise. . . . Foreign investment may consist of ‘direct investment’ or ‘portfolio investment’. The distinguishing factor is
the degree of managerial control acquired by the investor”).
Irrespective of this debate, most investment treaties have a specific yet
broad definition of “investment.” The 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) defines investment, for example, as “every asset that an investor
owns or controls, directly or indirectly . . . [including] (a) an enterprise; (b)
shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation . . . ; (d) futures, options,
and other derivatives; . . . (f ) intellectual property rights; . . . (h) other tangible
or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights,
such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges.” Model Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country]
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.[Country], art. 1, Feb. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/
Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S.
Model BIT].
20. See Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 406–07 (2006)
(outlining various scenarios involving foreign investment).
21. Ingo Selting, FDI and International Protection of Intellectual Property,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 19, at 205,
205–06.
22. A synthesis of the current investment treaty case law might reasonably suggest that services, construction, trade, and financial-related investments can qualify as investments under appropriate circumstances. See UNCTAD, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID]: MODULE 2.5,
REQUIREMENTS RATIONE MATERIAE 19–24 (2003), U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.4 (prepared by Alejandro A. Escobar), in UNCTAD,
COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
edmmisc232add4_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT]. But
see Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the
Application for Annulment of the Award (ICSID Nov. 1, 2006), http://ita.law
.uvic.ca/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf (holding that there was insufficient
evidence to conclude that a business providing legal services related to debt
collection qualified as investment in part because it lacked a nexus with development); UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra, at 17 (noting that the ICSID Secretariat refused to register a case because a supply contract for the
sale of goods was not deemed to be a qualifying investment).
23. For example, the World Bank explains that “[b]uilding rural roads
helps firms get their goods to market, and in Morocco also increased primary
school enrollment from 28 to 68 percent.” WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOP-
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Because of its importance to development and economic
prosperity, there is keen competition among developed and developing countries to attract foreign investment.24 Governments use various strategies at the national and sub-national
levels to facilitate this objective.25 Some of these strategies
might be straightforward, such as liberalizing an economic sector or providing tax incentives.26 Other strategies might be
more complex, such as improving the court system or creating
effective alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.27

REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 4 (2004),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/
complete_report.pdf [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005].
24. See Robert O. Keohane & Van Doorn Ooms, The Multinational Firm
and International Regulation, 29 INT’L ORG. 169, 170 (1975) (“Almost every
government in the world . . . attempts to entice foreign capital.”); Malcolm J.
Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 299, 314 (2001)
(“[G]overnments in both rich and poor nations compete in a ‘race to the bottom’
to attract needed foreign investment.”). There is evidence that this competition
is prevalent among developing countries. See Teresa Edwards, The Relocation
of Production and Effects on the Global Community, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 183, 190 (2002) (“[G]overnments of these less-developed countries,
in an effort to attract foreign investment, compete with one another to make
their standards the most attractive to the investing companies.”); Lawrence
Jahoon Lee, Barcelona Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting Its Customary
and Policy Underpinnings 35 Years Later, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 237, 266 (2006)
(“[D]eveloping states compete with each other to attract foreign investment . . . .”).
25. See Thomas W. Soseman, International Law—The Exon-Florio
Amendment to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National Security or a Protectionist Weapon?, 15 J. CORP. L. 597, 603 (1990) (“[S]tate and city governments fiercely compete with each other to attract foreign investment.”).
26. The World Bank, for example, suggests that governments might provide fiscal incentives (like tax concessions or subsidies), improve domestic infrastructure, promote a skilled labor force, establish agencies to promote foreign investment, improve the regulatory environment, or enter into
international agreements. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra
note 23, at 7–13; World Bank, Policies to Attract Foreign Direct Investment,
http://rru.worldbank.org/PapersLinks/ReadingList.aspx?topicid=10 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007); see also Paul J. Heald, Misreading a Canonical Work: An
Analysis of Mansfield’s 1994 Study, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 318 (2003) (critiquing empirical research suggesting the protection of intellectual property
rights fosters investment).
27. Franck, supra note 4, at 340 (discussing how India and China are attempting to improve their alternative dispute resolution systems as a tactic for
fostering foreign investment).
MENT
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B. INVESTMENT TREATIES
While there is mixed empirical evidence as to its actual
success in securing foreign investment, one popular tactic governments use to promote foreign investment is signing an investment treaty.28 An investment treaty is an agreement made
between two or more governments that safeguards investments
made in the territory of other signatory countries.29 For example, the United States and Ukraine might sign and ratify a bilateral investment treaty.30 The United States must then provide a series of rights to Ukrainian investors investing in the
United States. The reciprocal nature of the treaty means United States investors in the Ukraine will have those same rights.

28. While the stated goal of signing these international investment
agreements is largely to increase foreign investment levels, empirical analyses
are mixed as to whether treaties achieve that objective. See Franck, supra note
6, at 48–51 (outlining the issue); Franck, supra note 4, at 348–53 (surveying
the empirical literature, including studies by Hallward-Dreimer, RoseAckerman and Tobin, UNCTAD, Salacuse and Sullivan, Neumayer and Spess,
and Swenson, on the topic of how investment treaties affect foreign investment).
29. Franck, supra note 6, at 52. While these treaties typically take the
form of BITs, an emerging trend is the creation of larger, multilateral investment treaties (MITs) or a larger trade agreement. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey,
Bush’s Plan to Create Mideast Free Trade Area by 2013 Could Take Off This
Year, BNA WTO REPORTER, Jan. 20, 2006, http://pubs.bna.com/NWSSTND/IP/
BNA/wto.nsf/SearchAllView/E06B2B933FB0617D852570FC00042923?Open&
highlight=BUSH’S,PLAN,TO,CREATE (discussing the possibility of MiddleEast trade and investment treaties). MITs like the North American Free
Trade Agreement and Central American Free Trade Agreement function in
the same way as BITs, but provide investment protection on a multilateral basis. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. ch. 11, Dec. 17,
1992, 107 Stat. 2057 [hereinafter NAFTA]; Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement ch. 10, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTADR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]; see also Antonio R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern
Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments
on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 287, 290–95 (1997). MITs also tend to address issues beyond investment protection and may address issues such as rules of origin, customs obligations, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, and cross-border trade in services. See NAFTA, supra, chs. 4, 5, 7,
15; CAFTA-DR, supra, chs. 4, 5, 7, 11.
30. There is a treaty between the United States and Ukraine. See Treaty
Between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ukr., Mar. 4, 1994, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-37 (1994), available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_ukraine.pdf.
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By the end of 2005, there were at least 2495 investment
treaties signed among at least 175 different countries.31 The
proliferation of these investment treaties was a paradigm shift
for both substantive and procedural investor rights.
1. Substantive Rights
Rather than relying on the contested meaning of certain
international law standards, investment treaties articulate
specific substantive investment rights.32 In essence, investment
treaties provide foreign investors with an economic bill of rights
from a host state.33 Typically, these rights include guarantees
of appropriate compensation for expropriation, promises of
freedom from unreasonable or discriminatory measures, guarantees of national treatment for the investment, assurances of
fair and equitable treatment, promises that investments will
receive full protection and security, undertakings that a sovereign will honor its obligations, and assurances that foreign direct investment (FDI) will receive treatment no less favorable
than that accorded under international law.34 At a basic level,
investment treaties promise that host governments will not
treat investors and their investments unreasonably.35
2. Procedural Rights: Resolving Investment Treaty Disputes
Investment treaties are not simply revolutionary because
of the substantive protections that they provide. The real innovation was the grant of procedural rights.36 These rights offered
investors direct access to dispute resolution to redress their
grievances against host governments. Rather than creating un31. UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9; UNCTAD, Entry into Force, supra
note 4; see also UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004 at 221, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2004, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.33 (2004), available at http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2004_en.pdf; supra note 4 and accompanying text
(discussing the increase in the number of investment treaties).
32. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L.
639, 641 (1998) (discussing the uncertainty and controversy surrounding standards for international expropriation, including the rise and fall of the Hull
Rule).
33. Franck, supra note 6, at 48.
34. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 1–18 (1995); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment Protection, in RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 298, 299 (1997).
35. Franck, supra note 4, at 342.
36. Id.
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enforceable substantive rights or forcing investors to rely on
their home governments to resolve disputes on their behalf,
treaties provide a forum to redress alleged wrongs.37 Broadly
speaking, in what amounts to a sophisticated choice-of-forum
clause, investors have an opportunity to engage in nonbinding
or binding dispute resolution.38
II. CONFLICT THEORY AND DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN
With imperfect human beings involved, conflict is inherent
in foreign investment. Equipped with broad substantive rights
and a forum to redress perceived wrongs, creative investors are
testing the scope of their investment treaty rights.39 It is therefore useful to explore the general context of conflict resolution
theory in order to understand the specific implications for investment treaty conflict.40
A. CONFLICT THEORY
In a classic formulation, conflict has been compared to water.41 Both substances are neither inherently positive nor negative. Like water, conflict is necessary;42 but an overabundance
or shortage of this resource can inhibit its potential positive
force.43
37. See William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–14 (2006) (describing the evolution
from diplomatic protection to treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation to investment treaties); see also Franck, supra note 11, at 1525–29; infra
Part III.C.1 (discussing historical methods of resolving investment disputes).
38. See infra section Part III.C.2 for a detailed discussion of the dispute
resolution mechanisms typically available in investment treaties.
39. See infra notes 101–07 and accompanying text (discussing cases where
foreign investors have brought claims against host governments).
40. See infra Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the nature of investment treaty conflict.
41. William L. Ury, Foreword, in CATHY COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA
SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE
TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS, at xiii, xiii (1996).
42. See LEWIS COSER, FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 15–31 (1956);
MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 8–10 (1973); MARY PARKER FOLLETT, Constructive Conflict, in DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF MARY PARKER
FOLLETT 30, 30–31 (Henry C. Metcalf & L. Urwick eds., 1940); DEAN PRUITT &
SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 9–11 (3d ed. 2004).
43. See ALLAN J. STITT, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (1998); John W. Burton, Conflict Resolution as a Political Philos-
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This notion of conflict applies equally in the context of international investment.44 Conflict between foreign investors
and host governments occurs when interests diverge and where
parties are dissatisfied with an interaction, process, or substantive result. Despite its traditional negative connotation, investment conflict can be positive.45 Managed conflict creates
opportunities for commercial, social, and political innovation.46
It may, for example, attract attention to important issues that
require redress. Conflict can also lead to new insights and innovations by creating incentives to explore new ideas and develop alternative solutions.47 It may also provide opportunities
for more meaningful dialogue and the development of stronger
relationships and greater levels of investment.48
Imagine, for example, that a group of investment mavens49
who have made a foreign investment in a new country, geoophy, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE 55, 55–56 (Dennis J.D.
Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 1993); Dennis J.D. Sandole, Paradigm,
Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence or
Confusion?, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 3, 6–
7; Morton Deutsch, Introduction, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 1–16 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman
eds., 2000); Ury, supra note 41, at xiii; Kevin E. Joyce, Stop the Fight Without
Throwing in the Towel, LEGAL MGMT., Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 58, 58–60.
44. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1 (4th ed.
2005).
45. See John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes and International Tribunals: The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in International Jurisprudence, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2006) (stating
that, while “the existence of international conflict is invariably a sign that the
existing order is not satisfactorily accommodating the interests of every one of
the members of the international community . . . , conflict is necessary for the
development of any society”) (citation omitted).
46. See DEUTSCH, supra note 42, at 8–10 (identifying personal and social
benefits of conflict); FOLLETT, supra note 42, at 39–40 (identifying the benefits
of conflict in commercial and political contexts).
47. See Raymond Shonholtz, A General Theory on Disputes and Conflicts,
2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 403, 412 (observing, in the context of international conflict, that it “is better to have a process that manages conflicts as disputes, as
such mechanisms through experience and practice can correct, refine, and improve”).
48. See Joyce, supra note 43, at 60 (outlining positive aspects of conflict
such as deterring complacency, promoting greater understanding of views and
ideas, improving cohesiveness, enhancing innovation, increasing motivation,
and boosting productivity).
49. Malcolm Gladwell describes information “mavens” as those who are
intense gatherers of information and impressions, and so are often the first to
pick up on new or nascent trends. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT
59–60 (2002). Gladwell suggests that mavens may act most effectively in collaboration with “connectors,” namely charismatic people who have a wide net-
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graphic region, or market have a conflict with a government
regulator. If the conflict is addressed in a constructive manner,
there are opportunities for the country to increase investor
loyalty and develop a reputation for being a good place to invest, both of which may increase the likelihood of securing future investment.50
Unmanaged or improperly managed conflict, by contrast,
can have critical consequences. For example, the Argentinean
currency crisis of January 2002 led thirty-nine foreign investors to initiate claims under investment treaties for the economic harm they suffered from Argentina’s devaluation of the
peso.51 As a result, one tribunal awarded $133,200,000 in damages,52 another awarded $165,240,753,53 and a third held that
work of affiliations and who can transmit the advice or insight of a maven. Id.
at 55.
50. This is not dissimilar to a phenomenon Gladwell described in The
Tipping Point where, after Lexus first introduced its line of luxury cars in the
United States, the company realized there was a problem that required a recall. Id. at 277–78. Rather than let this conflict fester, Lexus made a special
effort to provide an exceptionally high level of customer service by calling each
owner individually the day the recall was announced. Id. In one case, a technician even flew from Los Angeles to Anchorage to make the necessary repairs.
Id. Acknowledging that only a small number of Lexus owners were actually
affected by the repairs, Lexus realized that by treating a small number of influential consumers well, it could benefit from conflict. Id. As Gladwell explained, “Lexus realized that it had a captive audience of Mavens and that if
they went the extra mile they could kick-start a word-of-mouth epidemic about
the quality of their customer service—and that’s just what happened. The
company emerged from what could have been a disaster with a reputation for
customer service that continues to this day.” Id.
51. UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
IIA MONITOR, No. 4 2006, at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/2,
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webiteiit20052_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD,
Latest Developments 2005].
52. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, 44 I.L.M. 1205,
1257 (ICSID May 12, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
CMS_FinalAward.pdf (holding that Argentina did not expropriate the investment or engage in arbitrary and discriminatory measures, but determining
that Argentina failed to provide fair and equitable treatment and failed to “observe any obligation it may have entered into”). An ad hoc committee recently
upheld all aspects of the award with the exception of the tribunal’s decision on
the observation of obligations (i.e., the so-called umbrella clause). CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 163
(ICSID Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/
arb0108_Annulment_Decision.pdf.
53. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 442
(ICSID July 14, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf (holding that Argentina did not expropriate the in-
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Argentina breached some (but not all) treaty obligations but
has not yet decided the quantum of damages.54
Beyond the financial costs of an adverse award, unmanaged conflict has other potential negative implications. There
may be challenges for a country’s international political credibility. For example, should a country fail to honor its investment treaty obligations,55 other governments might rightly
react with skepticism about that country’s willingness to comply with other international economic treaty obligations related
to tax or trade.56 Such a failure to adhere to agreed rules of law
might have an economic impact. This might include an increased skepticism that the country is a desirable foreign investment opportunity, making international lenders unwilling
to provide funds.57 These problems could lead to a failure to invest or a decision to invest only if there is an appropriately high

vestment but had (1) failed to provide fair and equitable treatment, (2) failed
to accord full protection and security, and (3) engaged in arbitrary measures).
54. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 267 (ICSID Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/LGEArgentinaLiability.pdf (holding that Argentina did not expropriate the foreign investment or treat it arbitrarily but that, except for during
a period of necessity, it “breached the standard of fair and equitable treatment, no less favorable treatment than that to be accorded under international law, and adopted discriminatory measures”). It is possible that this award
may provide the parties with a basis for a negotiated settlement.
55. There have been some public suggestions by Argentinean political officials that they may choose not to adhere to their legal obligations to enforce
adverse arbitration awards. See Osvaldo J. Marzoti, Enforcement of Treaty
Awards and National Constitutions, 7 BUS. L. INT’L 226, 226 (2006); Guido
Santiago Tawil, Arbitration in Latin America: Current Trends and Recent Developments,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070712134142/http://www
.bomchilgroup.org/argmar04.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (“Argentine top
officials have publicly argued the incompatibility of ICSID arbitration with the
Argentine Constitution, qualified ICSID arbitration as an immature regime,
[and] announced their will to return to the Calvo doctrine abandoned during
the [1990s].”). These public comments, particularly if Argentine officials follow
through, may have adverse political and economic consequences.
56. In the trade context, this might include obligations under regional
trade agreements or the World Trade Organization. In the tax context, it
might affect dispute resolution obligations under international tax treaties related to double taxation. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre le Gall, Foreword to WILLIAM
W. PARK & DAVID R. TILLINGHAST, INCOME TAX TREATY ARBITRATION 5, 5
(2004).
57. See, e.g., Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis
and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
449, 480–82 (2007) (suggesting that Argentina’s difficulties with its arbitration awards may be connected with its treatment of holders of its sovereign
debt).
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rate of return, which may pass the risk and cost onto citizens.58
It might also create credibility problems that lead to a decrease
in the bond rating associated with government debt instruments—such as Eurobonds—which may prevent governments
from raising money for public projects.59 Beyond this, there
may be social costs, such as the unrest during the “Cochabamba Water Wars,”60 or other consequences that adversely affect
development objectives.61
B. DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN
A properly designed dispute resolution system can draw
conflict to the surface and channel its productive forces. Dispute Systems Design (DSD) is the systematic process of creating a dispute resolution system that harnesses the positive aspects of conflict or at least minimizes the negative aspects.62
DSD originated in the Alternative Dispute Resolution
movement and draws on principles of quality control and organizational development.63 DSD is not a dispute resolution me58. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 48 (observing that uncertainty can impact investment decisions and may result in demanding higher rates of return for the extra risk).
59. See, e.g., id. at 36–37, 45–53 (discussing difficulties caused by government credibility).
60. OSCAR OLIVERA WITH TOM LEWIS, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA 33–47 (2004). The social protests related to the privatization of the water
sector may be an unrepresentative example of the possibility of social unrest
given the imposition of martial law and the nature of the protests. It is nevertheless an interesting case history on the implications of international investment disputes.
61. Jan Paulsson, Third World Participation in International Investment
Arbitration, 2 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 19, 55 (1987) (“Rejection of duly
rendered awards harms the atmosphere of mutual confidence necessary to the
process of development . . . if a State enterprise of a developing country repudiates its obligation to respect a duly rendered arbitration award, it not only
poisons its relationship with the individual foreign company seeking to rely on
the award, but also risks damage to its relations with the ensemble of investors and lenders whose participation is indispensable to the country’s development strategy.”).
62. See STITT, supra note 43, at 9–11; see also CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 739–47
(2005) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., ADR]; CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW
ET AL., MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY AND ETHICS 417, 437–40 (2006) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., MEDIATION].
63. STITT, supra note 43, at xv–xvi; see also Brack Brown, Public Organizations and Policies in Conflict: Notes on Theory and Practice, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 158, 168–69; Michael L.
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, Perspectives on Dispute Resolution, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 14, at 1, 23 (observing that
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thodology itself. Rather it is the intentional and systematic creation of an effective, efficient, and fair dispute resolution
process based upon the unique needs of a particular system.64
The objective of DSD is to design better dispute resolution
systems. It does so by (1) analyzing parties’ patterns of disputing to diagnose the current system, (2) designing methods to
manage conflict more effectively with practical principles, (3)
approving and implementing the design architecture, and (4)
testing and evaluating the new design to make appropriate revisions prior to disseminating the process to the rest of the system.65 As sagely explained by one commentator, this description
oversimplifies a complex, challenging process that will almost never
satisfy all the stakeholders. A DSD process does, however, offer the
potential for organizations, courts, and communities to manage their
conflict management system wisely and address concerns such as
whether their system needs more of the values that court trials provide.66

Both private and public organizations have used DSD
techniques to create conflict management systems that settle
disputes through a range of processes.67 Corporations have emDSD has been developed to help parties “craft a menu or tiered system of dispute processes tailored for particular organizations or dispute types, especially
in settings of repetitive disputes or complex legal disputes”).
64. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (defining DSD as a process
of analyzing existing patterns of disputing, creating new processes, and implementing and evaluating the new system to improve its efficacy).
65. See WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING
SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 41–64 (1988); James P. Groton, The
Progressive or “Stepped” Approach to ADR: Designing Systems to Prevent, Control, and Resolve Disputes, in CONSTRUCTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORMBOOK 1, 6 (Robert F. Cushman et al. eds., 1997) (“The design of a dispute resolution system is not directed at settling a particular dispute, but rather at
changing the overall pattern of dispute resolution and ultimately changing for
the better the attitudes and relationships of the parties.”); John Lande, Using
Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in CourtConnected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 112–17 (2002); Peter
Robinson et al., DyADS: Encouraging “Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems” in
the Organized Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 339, 344 (2005) (explaining that DSD goes “beyond specific disputes or dispute resolution mechanisms
and instead tak[es] a broader look at the full range of conflict within an organization in order to determine how best to prevent or address the types of conflicts the organization experiences over time”).
66. John Lande, Shifting the Focus from the Myth of “The Vanishing Trial” to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or I Learned Almost Everything
I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution from Marc Galanter, 6 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 191, 209 (2005).
67. Id.
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braced DSD to avoid the expense and destructiveness of individual dispute litigation, and because they realize the value of
improved communication and conflict management in development of high-performance organizations.68
Outside the investment context, the use of DSD has transformed distressed systems into healthy ones with fewer transaction costs.69 Improvements include (1) less lost time and
money to resolve a conflict, (2) fewer missed commercial opportunities, and (3) fewer outbreaks of violence and decreased
resort to power struggles.70 Meanwhile, DSD can enhance
communication and increase party satisfaction with the process
and result.71
In William L. Ury’s classic and effective use of DSD at the
Caney Creek coal mine, the typical “dispute resolution” process
initially involved employees filing hundreds of grievances each
year.72 Cases were not settled by negotiation. Instead, they
went to arbitrations that took years to complete. Meanwhile
party frustration with ongoing problems regularly boiled over
into “wildcat” strikes. After a dispute resolution team established the trust of employers and employees, it analyzed the
disputing system and devised a new set of approaches to facilitate low-cost and rapid resolution of most disputes. Disputes
did not disappear, but the parties were better satisfied with the
fairness with which disputes were addressed.73 Another useful
by-product was that the rate of strikes dropped considerably.74
Given its success, DSD has grown beyond its original use
in United States domestic legal institutions related to employment, family law, and consumer protection.75 Multinational

68. Robinson et al., supra note 65, at 344.
69. See URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 170–71.
70. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 172–75, 191–98; URY
ET AL., supra note 65, at 169–72.
71. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 172–75, 191–98; URY
ET AL., supra note 65, at 169–72.
72. See URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 104–08.
73. See id. at 101, 108–15, 130–31.
74. Id. at 130–32.
75. See LISA B. BINGHAM, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, MEDIATION
AT WORK: TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE CONFLICT AT THE UNITED STATES
POSTAL SERVICE 4 (2003); Robinson et al., supra note 65, at 342–46 (discussing
the application of DSD and related techniques to the workplace). But see Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases Is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving
Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 286 (1998) (cautioning that the planning of
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commercial entities and government institutions increasingly
resort to DSD to establish a tailor-made web of dispute settlement methods to meet individualized needs.76 International
commentators continue to recommend the use of DSD to manage disputes in other jurisdictions.77
C. AN APPLICATION TO INVESTMENT TREATY CONFLICT?
Despite the effectiveness of DSD, there has been little literature considering its utility in approaching investment treaty
disputes. An emerging body of literature discusses the use of
nonbinding dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation
and conciliation, on investment treaty claims.78 Nevertheless,

resolving employment disputes “should be approached with careful thought
and planning”).
76. See Nancy J. Manring, Dispute Systems Design and the U.S. Forest
Service, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 13, 20 (1993) (describing how the United States
Forest Service institutionalized its dispute resolution procedures and outlining
challenges for implementing a comprehensive DSD system); Khalil Z. Shariff,
Designing Institutions to Manage Conflict: Principles for the Problem Solving
Organization, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 133, 139–42, 157–58 (2003) (providing
a background on DSD and suggesting a framework for conflict management in
post-Taliban Afghanistan); Nancy A. Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 14, at
487, 489 (discussing how Motorola, General Mills, Shell, and Coca-Cola
adopted company-wide programs to understand and manage disputes).
77. Kenneth Cloke, Conflict Resolution Systems Design, the United Nations and the New World Order, 8 MEDIATION Q. 343, 343–44 (1991) (applying
DSD principles to the United Nations); Jose Alberto Ramirez Leon, Why Further Development of ADR in Latin America Makes Sense: The Venezuelan
Model, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 399, 413 (recommending that Venezuela implement DSD techniques “so that effective policies can be applied to satisfy the
needs of the potential users”).
78. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 7, 7–31 (2005); Barton Legum, The Difficulties of Conciliation on Investment Treaty Cases: A Comment on Professor Jack C. [sic] Coe’s “Towards a
Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary
Sketch,” MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Apr. 2006, at 23; Lester Nurick & Stephen
J. Schnably, The First ICSID Conciliation: Tesoro Petroleum Corporation v.
Trinidad & Tobago, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 340, 340–50 (1986);
Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, The Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience, NEWS FROM ICSID (Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of
Inv. Dispute), 2005, at 12, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/
news_22-2.pdf; Noah Rubins, Comments to Jack C. [sic] Coe Jr.’s Article on
Conciliation, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Apr. 2006, at 21; Thomas Wälde, Mediation/Alternative Dispute Resolution in Oil, Gas and Energy Transactions:
Superior to Arbitration/Litigation from a Commercial and Management Perspective, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2, 2–13 (2004), available at http://www
.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol13/article13-8.pdf.
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this work is being done on an ad hoc basis and does not consider dispute resolution systematically.
Systematic consideration is critical.79 Various commentators suggest the dispute resolution system is in crisis80 and its
utility is subject to debate.81 Meanwhile, the United Nations
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) suggests
these challenges “could be addressed by improving the dispute
settlement procedures”82 and the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has made certain
procedural changes with the intent of improving the process of
resolving disputes by arbitration.83 This puts the evolution of
investment treaty disputes at a unique historical junction: we
are simultaneously presented with concerns about the system’s
efficacy and the opportunity to improve its future development.
Now may be the right time for DSD to borrow a page from
Caney Creek’s success and secure the benefits for investment
treaty conflict. DSD could create processes that manage treaty
conflict in a timely, cost-efficient manner. It might also foster
systems that respond to stakeholder needs while avoiding phys-

79. As Andrea Schneider observes, particularly for international dispute
resolution, it is vital to understand how dispute resolution processes started,
developed, and currently operate to determine how to make the system work
best. Schneider, supra note 14, at 451.
80. See Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment:
How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 88 (2004) (explaining that NAFTA’s dispute resolution system creates a “legal bifurcation” that leads to the application of different laws to domestic corporations and foreign investors); Brower, supra note
11, at 74; Franck, supra note 11, at 1583; supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
81. See generally COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Karl P. Sauvant ed.) (forthcoming 2007); see also WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 179–80 (discussing the various
debates about the efficacy of investor-state dispute settlement, including problems related to putting too much discipline on governments, encroaching on
regulatory prerogatives, and insufficient transparency).
82. UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 53–54.
83. ICSID, ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES 7–43 (2006), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf
[hereinafter
ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES]; ICSID, ICSID CONVENTION RULES AND
REGULATIONS 51–99 (2006), available at http://worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/
basicdoc.htm [hereinafter ICSID CONVENTION RULES]; ICSID, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 1–14 (Oct. 22, 2004) (unpublished discussion paper, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
highlights/improve-arb.pdf ); ICSID, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules
and Regulations 3–5 (May 12, 2005) (working paper, available at http://
worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf ).
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ical violence84 and protest.85 DSD could also promote creative
problem solving to resolve disputes according to the parties’ interests and provide relief that a judge or arbitrator would be
unable to offer.86
III. A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO INVESTMENT
TREATY CONFLICT AND DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN
Investment treaties and DSD share at least one core concern: both are interested in the effective management of conflict.87 Governments presumably sign investment treaties to
promote investment by providing investors with substantive legal rights.88 Having reasonably anticipated that conflict might
result from the grant of those rights,89 governments created a
process to manage the conflict.90 DSD offers an approach to
84. In Lemire v. Ukraine, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 530, 530–41
(2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemire-Award.pdf, for example, there were allegations about physical violence that occurred in connection with a government’s treatment of foreign investment. See infra notes 107
and 209 (discussing the Lemire case).
85. See supra note 60 (discussing the Cochabamba Water Wars).
86. See infra notes 208–09 (discussing the creative settlement in Lemire v.
Ukraine).
87. It is possible that governments intend investment treaties to promote
other objectives, such as the facilitation of development, the elimination of poverty, or the development of the rule of law. It is even possible that such interests may, at some point, be in conflict. For the purposes of exploring the synergies with DSD, however, this Article focuses on the presumably mutual, and
fundamental, objective of needing to manage conflict effectively.
88. There has been little empirical analysis considering the motivation
and intention of governments in signing investment treaties. Future analysis
might usefully consider the governmental intention as regards the signing of
investment treaties by exploring the text of investment treaties, travaux
prépatoires, signing statements, governmental press releases, or legislative
debates regarding treaty implementation. Such an analysis of government intention may provide useful interpretive insights for treaty rights as well as
information about whether the governments received the intended benefits.
89. As of February 28, 1977, the United States Department of State estimated that there were at least 102 investment disputes between United
States nationals and foreign governments. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT:
The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 655, 659 n.32 (1990). Between
1960 and 1974, the United Nations identified 875 distinct governmental takings of foreign property in sixty-two countries. Id. It is unclear, however,
whether investors’ home governments ever pursued these claims. Id.
90. Governments need not provide a process to resolve investment disputes. See Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have
Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. 189, 190 (2007) (analyzing a sample of treaties and determining that
only half contained dispute resolution provisions).
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conflict management focused on effectively and fairly managing
individual cases on a systematic basis. Given the unique but related nature of these two areas, the fundamental question is:
How, if at all, might these distinct areas of law usefully inform
each other?
Effective use of DSD to manage investment treaty conflict
is likely to reduce the transaction costs of dispute resolution.91
This could decrease investment risks, lower the cost of investing, and produce economic incentives that make host governments more attractive investment opportunities.92 As the
World Bank explains, effective dispute resolution under investment treaties benefits investors and governments:
Governments benefit from a commitment device that can address
concerns from investors, and thus help them attract more investment
at lower cost, and also reduces the risk of any later dispute becoming
politicized. Firms benefit from reduced risk and a more reliable mechanism for protecting their rights if the relationship with the host
government deteriorates.93

Without effective dispute resolution, the goal of using investment treaties to promote investment is undermined.94 Investors need security, transparency, predictability, reliability,
and certainty in the planning of their investments and the resolution of related disputes.95 Poorly planned and poorly managed
dispute resolution increases the cost of resolving disputes, amplifies investment risk, and generates investment disincentives. On a larger scale, the poor management of investment
treaty conflict could undermine the success of the investment

91. The World Bank observes that uncertainty can impact investment decisions in various ways, such as demanding higher rates of return for the extra
risk involved, which results in less investment at higher prices. It may also
mean that investors may simply refuse to invest at all. WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 48.
92. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing India and China’s efforts to spur investment by creating more effective dispute resolution
systems).
93. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 179.
94. See Koremenos, supra note 90, at 209 (suggesting that the “decision to
include certain activities (like dispute resolution) within the governance structure of an international agreement is the result of a cost-benefit analysis” that
is presumably provided to further the objectives of the treaty).
95. Governments similarly need certainty, predictability, and reliability in
order to govern effectively, efficiently, and fairly. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 36–37 (observing that “[g]overnments need to
provide clear rules of the game” and noting that “[p]ublic trust and confidence
in markets and firms affect not only the feasibility of reforms, but . . . the response of firms”).
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treaty regime. If DSD can improve the dispute resolution system and promote efficient conflict management, it is worthy of
consideration.
Section A considers possible application of DSD methodology to investment treaty conflict, recognizing that we are not
yet in a position to apply DSD principles fully.96 Section B discusses the nature of investment treaty conflict and how DSD
can inform its analysis. Section C considers the historical and
current methods for resolving investment treaty conflict, and
Section D deconstructs those methods and considers the costs
and benefits of the current approach to resolving investment
conflict. Future scholarship will hopefully use this roadmap to
apply DSD principles in greater detail.
A. DSD: SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR INVESTMENT TREATIES
An initial aspect of the DSD process analyzes (1) what
types of conflict exist, (2) what systems are in place to address
that conflict, and (3) what about the system is effective and
what is inefficient.97 Once this phase is complete, designers can
determine how best to structure, alter, or augment the existing
system according to mutually acceptable principles.98 Thereafter, the design can be implemented, tested, evaluated, and improved as necessary.99
Using this approach, one might imagine that Argentina,
for example, could take stock of its investment treaty arbitration experiences, particularly given the number of cases related
to its currency crisis.100 Such a diagnosis might involve inviting
96. Given the current state of the literature and the lack of general or
specific empirical assessments, as well as the lack of shared principles upon
which a dispute resolution system should be based, it would also be challenging to do this on a microlevel (i.e., looking at a specific treaty). Narrowing the
field of analysis to particular countries could provide significant benefits and
provide even more tailor-made dispute resolution procedures.
97. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 96–116; THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 99–136, 169–97 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds.,
1999) (detailing the initial steps of DSD); URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 20–40
(evaluating existing dispute resolution systems); Lande, supra note 65, at 115
(describing the initial steps of how DSD might be used in the context of courtconnected mediation); Shariff, supra note 76, at 139–40 (discussing the need
for DSD to be deliberate and purposeful in order to create a system that
achieves desired objectives).
98. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 117–33; URY ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 101–33.
99. See supra notes 65–66 (describing phases of the DSD process).
100. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
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experts to assess what conduct created potential liability, those
sectors affected, and the types of disputes that actually arose.
Experts might then assess the adequacy of the current arbitration process and the scope of possible improvements given the
principles Argentina wishes to promote in its dispute resolution
procedures.
Hypothetically, to save taxpayer and governmental resources and create solutions in the best interests of all parties,
Argentina might prefer to mediate and engage in creative problem solving. In the absence of a settlement, however, Argentina
might wish to resolve its disputes under different treaties in
one place, such as a court or mixed claims commission, that
may be open to the public. Such an arrangement would provide
cost-efficient dispute resolution in a single, public forum for the
resolution of disputes related to a single government measure.
If, however, Argentina determined that there was a benefit in
the flexibility of ad hoc but potentially inconsistent decisions of
arbitration tribunals, it might retain the current mechanism.
Having designed a process based upon the assessment and
foundational principles, Argentina might then draft a model
investment treaty and use it as a basis for future treaty negotiations. Argentina might have an opportunity to assess the utility of the new procedures and determine whether further
changes to the design were warranted. The remainder of this
Part explores this potential approach in a generalized way by
considering historical and current approaches to investment
treaty conflict.
B. THE NATURE OF INVESTMENT TREATY CONFLICT
1. Investment Treaty Conflict
Investment treaty conflict typically arises when government conduct has a direct or indirect adverse effect upon a foreign investment. Historically, this involved activities associated
with a traditional international law violation, such as the nationalization of a business without fair compensation.101 These
days, investment treaty conflict can arise from more subtle
government conduct, such as (1) the revocation of a banking licases/pending.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter ICSID Pending
Cases] (listing cases involving Argentina’s currency crisis).
101. See, e.g., Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. 4,
15, 32 (July 20) (addressing an alleged treaty violation involving the public
taking of private business assets).

FRANCK_6FMT

186

12/13/2007 9:08 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:161

cense,102 (2) a change in the interpretation of tax law that decreases an anticipated refund,103 (3) the implementation of an
environmental regulation that has a disparate but adverse financial impact upon foreign investors,104 (4) a failure to advise
an investor about the licenses needed to operate an investment,105 or (5) an alleged breach of a commercial contract to
which the government was a party.106
As a concrete example of how conflict can arise, imagine a
United States investor buys a privatized group of Ukrainian
radio stations, develops broadcasting capacity, and becomes the
market leader of innovative radio programming. Then imagine
that some government conduct prevents the investor from utilizing the broadcast frequencies, and the government fails to
renew the investor’s broadcasting license. The United States
investor, who once had a profitable business, wants to redress
the perceived wrong. In some sense, this resembles Lemire v.
Ukraine, where after failing to resolve the dispute amicably, a
United States media entrepreneur, Joseph Lemire, initiated
arbitration against Ukraine under the United States/Ukraine
bilateral investment treaty.107
102. See, e.g., Genin v. Estonia, 17 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 395, 471
(2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Genin-Award.pdf.
103. See, e.g., Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, No. UN3467,
2004 WL 3267260, at ¶ 29 (London Ct. Int’l Arb. July 1, 2004).
104. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1345 (UNCITRAL 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizations/
51052.pdf.
105. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 36, 41–42 (ICSID 2001),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf.
106. See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, No.
ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (ICSID
Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SGSvPhil-final_
001.pdf; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, 21 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J.
203,
244–46
(2006),
available
at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
LGEArgentinaLiability.pdf (finding a failure to adhere to obligations where
there was an “abrogation of the guarantees under the statutory framework”).
These are referred to as “umbrella clause” claims. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra
note 34, at 81–82.
107. See Lemire v. Ukraine, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 530, 530–41
(2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemire-Award.pdf. Although the details are unknown given the proceedings’ confidential nature,
there is some public information. See Marek Hessel & Ken Murphy, Stealing
the State, and Everything Else: A Survey of Corruption in the Postcommunist
World (working paper, available at http://www.toni-schonfelder.com/print
.asp?idte=243) (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (explaining that when Gala Radio—
Mr. Lemire’s station—“lawfully reported its income, announcing a profit on
which it paid taxes, all hell broke loose. Gala was banned from the airwaves,
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2. Using DSD: Systematic Analysis of Investment Treaty
Conflict
The previous section offers specific examples of investment
conflict that have resulted in a final arbitration award. It does
not, however, look at investment treaty conflict systematically
to describe the universe of investment conflict. DSD adds this
vital element and looks beyond the tip of the iceberg to provide
a more complete picture of investment treaty conflict. DSD
would recommend a system-wide diagnostic to seek out information about the characteristics of investment conflict.108 This,
in turn, would permit stakeholders to create more efficient and
properly tailored dispute resolution systems.
At present, there has not been a systematic conflict assessment109—let alone general empirical research—to analyze
investment treaty conflict. There has been some scrutiny of
NAFTA-based investment claims submitted to arbitration, but
there is little attention given to investment treaties more
broadly.110
UNCTAD has done groundbreaking work that analyzes the
increasing number of arbitration claims brought.111 At the end

equipment was stolen, another station with the same name and logo appeared
on the same radio frequency, with a license issued by the National Council on
Radio and Television Broadcasting”); see also Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1999: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 385–402 (1998) (testimony of
Joseph Lemire, President, Gala Radio & TV Co. and Olympic Champions,
Ltd.) [hereinafter Foreign Operations].
108. DSD might be able to examine, for example, what types of conflict do
not escalate. For example, it might be able to analyze those cases where disputes are negotiated, settled, or abandoned prior to the crystallization of the
dispute or the filing of a request for arbitration.
109. See Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a
Conflict Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 97,
at 99–135 (describing various approaches to conducting conflict assessments).
110. See, e.g., Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 401–07
(2003) (outlining a “score card” of investment treaty cases arising under NAFTA); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An
Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1455–60 (2003) (providing data about NAFTA-based claims).
But see Franck, supra note 13.
111. See UNCTAD, Latest Developments 2005, supra note 51 (identifying
the number of investment treaty arbitrations, breaking the numbers down by
institution, and discussing which sectors the disputes arise in); UNCTAD, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 13–15 (discussing recent trends in invest-
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of 2005, UNCTAD identified at least 229 known arbitration
cases, two-thirds of which were filed within the last five
years.112 In the first eleven months of 2006, at least another
twenty-five claims were filed.113 The financial impact of these
cases is not insignificant. While sometimes governments lose
and sometimes they win,114 the amounts in dispute can involve
hundreds of millions of dollars115 and tribunals can make large
awards against a government, such as the $270 million award
in CME v. Czech Republic.116 Despite its value, UNCTAD’s
work is limited. It only considers disputes submitted to arbitrament treaty disputes). See generally UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9 (reviewing recent disputes arising from investment treaties).
112. Press Release, UNCTAD, UNCTAD Reviews Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Cases and Draws Implications for Developing Countries (Feb. 5,
2006),
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6967&
intItemID=1528&lang=1 (observing that the “cumulative number of known
treaty-based cases [was] at least 229 through the end of the 2005 ([although]
the number stood at 219 at the time of printing of [UNCTAD’s] report)”); UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 4–5 (referring to the 219 disputes filed as of
November 2005). One of the difficulties with this work, however, is the lack of
transparency about UNCTAD’s research methodology, which creates uncertainties. This makes it difficult to replicate the results or assess the study’s
validity and reliability.
113. Latest Developments 2005, supra note 51, at 2. Although the methodology was not explained, the publication did indicate that the draft was prepared by Federico Ortino who works with the Investment Treaty Forum affiliated with the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. See
id.; see also UNCTAD Study Provides New Data on Incidence of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable
Dev., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Can.), Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/
itn_jan12_2006.pdf (suggesting that Luke Eric Peterson authored similar research and briefly describing his methodology).
114. See Franck, supra note 13 (observing that, in the context of final arbitration awards that were publicly available prior to June 1, 2006, governments
won approximately 57.7% of the time, investors won 38.5% of the time, and
the remaining cases were resolved through settlement agreements).
115. Charles H. Brower, II, Council Comment: Reform Priorities at International Trade & Investment Institutions, 21 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. NEWSLETTER
(Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Wash., D.C.), Aug.–Oct. 2005, at 6 (indicating that “ICSID’s
docket comprises some 90 cases involving $25 billion, as opposed to five cases
involving $15 million ten years ago”); see also Franck, supra note 13 (suggesting that the average amount claimed from publicly available awards was in
the order of $343 million).
116. See UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 9–12 (outlining the potential financial impacts of investment treaty arbitration awards and noting the
$270 million award against the Czech Republic in one case); cf. Franck, supra
note 13 (suggesting that the average amount received is on the order of $10
million for all final awards and on the order of $25 million for final awards
where investors recover, which indicates that the $270 million award of CME
v. Czech Republic appears to be a statistical outlier).
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tion; it does not address investment treaty conflict subject to
other types of dispute resolution.117
A DSD diagnostic could gather basic information about
whether the conflict involves factual, technical, legal, interpersonal, communication, or political issues. Such a diagnostic
might also usefully evaluate which investment sectors tend to
experience high levels of conflict, the types of harm investors
experience, the government conduct most likely to lead to allegations of harm, any explanations given for government conduct, the ways governments find out about disputes, the ways
nonparties influence the conflict, which treaties are most frequently invoked in arbitrations, which treaty signatories and
investors are involved in investment disputes, and the variables that affect the escalation or resolution of the conflict.118
In this manner, parties can identify the types of conflict that
may arise in the future119 and create challenges. They can also
identify processes to promote effective conflict resolution.120
Such an analysis may be useful, in part, because investment treaties were originally promulgated to deal with cases of

117. Franck, supra note 13.
118. One preliminary study analyzing publicly available arbitration
awards has begun this process. See generally Franck, supra note 13. It considers what sectors experience conflict, which investors are invoking the treaties,
which countries are subjected to claims, and which treaties are arbitrated. Id.
The work, however, does not consider all of the issues recommended in this
article and is also not a comprehensive assessment of investment treaty conflict. Id. It may, however, provide a useful starting point for future empirical
assessment. Id.
119. It may even be useful to gather this data in order to create various diagnostic tools that predict the types of disputes likely to arise in the future.
The construction industry has conducted analysis of construction disputes and
the characteristics of construction projects. Groton, supra note 65, at 9. This
analysis led to the development of the Disputes Potential Index, or DPI, that
“identifies the presence of dispute-prone characteristics on a project, evaluates
them, and reports the results to project team members so they can take action
to correct them before they actually generate problems.” Id. Taking a page
from the construction industry—whether on a country-by-country or industryby-industry basis—may yield useful information about investment-related
conflict and the most useful methods to manage it.
120. Under the Pareto Principle, for example, eighty percent of a problem
can be attributed to twenty percent of the causes. Focusing on the most serious issues may be useful at the outset, but the remaining eighty percent of
the causes should not be ignored. See Joseph M. Juran, The Quality Control
Process, in JURAN’S QUALITY HANDBOOK 5.1, 5.20–5.24 (Joseph M. Juran & A.
Blanton Godfrey eds., 5th ed. 1999) (applying the Pareto principles to issues of
quality control).
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expropriation.121 With the grant of new rights—such as the
right to “fair and equitable treatment” and the so-called umbrella clause—the nature of problematic government conduct,
investor claims, and parties’ needs are likely shifting.122 It
would be useful to identify and understand the areas of most
significant risk. This would ensure that conflict is managed
through the process most likely to result in an appropriate resolution. In other words, the forum should fit the fuss.123
C. THE SYSTEMS TO ADDRESS INVESTMENT CONFLICT
After a diagnostic of investment treaty conflict, DSD requires consideration of the methods to resolve disputes. This
section considers the historical and current methods for resolving investment treaty disputes.
1. Historical Antecedents: The Previous Methods of Resolving
Investment Treaty Conflict
In the past, foreign investors had limited options for redressing international law violations. When government conduct adversely affected an investment, investors were relegated
to a series of somewhat unappealing dispute resolution options.
This typically left investors (1) to the political mercies of their
own government, the host government, or both when deciding
whether a claim should be brought to address the investor’s
complaints, (2) litigating in the host government’s national
courts where defenses of sovereign immunity were often readily
available, or (3) absorbing the cost of adverse government action by either doing nothing or making a claim under their po-

121. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 168–69 (2005).
122. The different nature of the rights may call for the availability of different dispute resolution mechanisms. In expropriation cases, the loss is
usually close to one hundred percent, damages can be quite large, and it may
be difficult to negotiate a settlement. In contrast, a claim for fair and equitable
treatment may be subject to a different set of damages. Because damages may
be lower, there is likely to be a broader zone of possible agreement between
the parties. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: HOW TO AVOID ESCALATING CONFRONTATION, NEEDLESS
COSTS, AND UNNECESSARY LITIGATION 35 (2000) (discussing zones of possible
agreement).
123. See Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the
Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION
J. 49, 66 (1994).
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litical risk insurance.124 Ultimately these limited opportunities
were often unpalatable for investors who had suffered severe or
even total losses related to government expropriation.125
2. The Current Framework for Resolving Investment Treaty
Conflict
The creation of investor-state dispute resolution mechanism in investment treaties was a sea change. These new provisions provided investors with the means to bring host governments to the dispute resolution table.126
Treaties are individually negotiated and there is no uniform dispute resolution process. There is, however, a general
trend.127 Many treaties have a two-tiered dispute resolution
process leading towards a final resolution by an arbitration tribunal.128

124. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1620–21 n.469; Salacuse, supra note 9.
For those cases where an investor has contracted directly with a host government—for example, in the context of a concession contract—investors may also
have a contractual right to arbitrate disputes arising out of or relating to that
underlying commercial arrangement. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 6,
at 185–210 (discussing options for investors in contract disputes with governments).
125. See Salacuse, supra note 89, at 659 n.32.
126. The investor-state dispute resolution mechanism is a distinct issue
from the state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms also typically provided
in investment treaties. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Has the Proliferation of
BITs Gone Too Far? Is It Now Time for a Multilateral Investment Treaty?, 5 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 89, 90–91 (2004) (describing the new development of requesting state-to-state arbitration to interpret a BIT); Franck, supra note 6, at
53–54 n.26 (discussing cases where state-to-state arbitration was initiated after an investor-state claim was initiated). While this Article primarily focuses
on investor-state arbitration, to complete a thorough analysis of the system
and given the potential for cross-contamination, both aspects of the system deserve serious consideration.
127. E.g., U.N. CTR. TRANSNAT’L CORPS., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES at 66–70, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65, U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.A.1 (1988); UNCTAD, BITs, supra note 4, at 92–96; UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INVESTOR-STATE at 12–13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30, U.N. Sales No.
E.03.II.D.5 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit30_en.pdf
[hereinafter UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT]; DOLZER &
STEVENS, supra note 34, at 119–21.
128. E.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United Arab
Emirates for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-U.A.E., art.
8(1), Dec. 8, 1992, 1994 U.K.T.S. No. 24, available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_uae.pdf.
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a. First-Tier Dispute Resolution
The first tier of the dispute resolution is about fulfilling
certain conditions precedent to having the right to arbitrate.129
This may, for example, require investors to engage in “amicable
settlement” for a few months.130 Although less frequent, investors may also be required to litigate in home government courts
and exhaust their local remedies before proceeding to their international ones.131 In some circumstances, however, there is
no obligation to engage in a pre-arbitration dispute resolution
process or even a suggestion that such a method might be prudent.132
Regardless of whether investors are required or recommended to engage in these activities, there are often other preconditions to accessing arbitration. First, investors must often
submit a dispute notice.133 Second, investors are typically required to wait for a few months—often three to six—to “cool
129. See id. (providing for informal resolution prior to arbitration). Furthermore, not all investment treaties permit arbitration. For example, a treaty
between Japan and the Philippines states that in the absence of a subsequent
agreement to a formal investor-state dispute resolution procedure, arbitration
can only occur with both parties’ consent. Agreement Between Japan and the
Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership, Japan-Phil., art. 107,
Sept. 9, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/epa0609/main
.pdf.
130. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 127, at
22–23; Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment:
Foreign Direct Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18
N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 50 (2005); see also NAFTA, supra note 29, ch.11, art. 1118
(referring instead to dispute settlement by “consultation or negotiation”).
Many treaties do not make “amicable settlement” mandatory. Sometimes they
do not even mention it as an option, and in other instances it is merely a recommended, nonbinding option. Instead, treaties permit investors to bypass
this step and go directly to arbitration, provided they meet all other preconditions, like submitting a dispute notice. See infra note 272 (discussing the various positions of the U.S. Model BITs on the issue of mandatory versus optional
negotiation).
131. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 876 (2005); Vandevelde, supra note 121, at 174–75.
132. The 1994 U.S. Model BIT did not refer to pre-arbitration negotiation,
consultation, or the amicable resolution of disputes. Model Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country]
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.[Country], art. IX, Apr. 1994, reprinted in UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM VOL. III at 201–02, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTC/30, U.N. Sales No. E.96.II.A.11 (1996).
133. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 130, at 50; see also 2004 U.S.
Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 24(2)–(3).
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off” from the time the dispute arose to when it can formally request arbitration.134 As a practical matter, this might mean
that some kind of negotiation can occur during the prescribed
waiting period after an investor submits a dispute notice.135 It
also means, however, that an investor may be able to submit a
dispute notice and head to arbitration without ever trying and
perhaps without even considering other forms of dispute resolution.136
b. Second-Tier Dispute Resolution
At the second tier, governments typically offer to arbitrate
claims of treaty violations to finally resolve disputes.137 Treaties usually permit investors to choose where to arbitrate those
claims. Often, this means investors can elect to arbitrate before
(1) an ad hoc tribunal organized under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, (2) the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or (3) a
tribunal organized through ICSID.138
When investors fulfill their first-tier obligations but the
conflict remains unresolved, an investor then selects an arbitral forum from the treaty and submits a “Request for Arbitra134. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 127, at
25; see also Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of
Ecuador for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Ecuador, art.
8, May 10, 1994, 1996 U.K.T.S. No. 18, available at http://www.unctad.org/
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ecuador_uk.pdf (permitting the arbitration of disputes where “agreement cannot be reached within six months between the
parties to this dispute through the pursuit of local remedies or otherwise”).
135. This appears to be the hope of certain institutions. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 88 (suggesting disputes can be resolved with informal negotiation).
136. Presumably, it would not necessarily be in an investor’s economic, rational self-interest to incur the costs of arbitration without having tried other
types of dispute resolution. This, however, presumes that investors are rational, profit-maximizing individuals. There may be situations where the initiation
of a process will waste resources if appropriate government officials have indicated they are unwilling to consider such a process.
137. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 129–56. In some cases, countries let investors elect between national courts, pre-existing dispute resolution arrangements, and international arbitration in order to finally resolve the
dispute. Franck, supra note 11, at 1541–42. There are few, if any, known instances where an investor has brought an investment treaty claim to either a
national court or a pre-agreed dispute resolution process. Franck, supra note
6, at 54–55; see also Franck, supra note 11, at 1542 n.78 (noting that investment claims might go to national courts but only where investors are unaware
of their arbitration options).
138. See Franck, supra note 6, at 54.
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tion” or equivalent document.139 The investor then selects one
arbitrator.140 After, the state picks a second arbitrator, and the
parties typically select a third arbitrator who serves as the
chair.141 Next, the parties gather evidence and present arguments,142 and the tribunal renders an award that is enforceable
worldwide.143
3. Consideration of Specific Dispute Resolution Provisions
It could be appropriate to assess a country’s specific dispute resolution systems. This might occur at a macrolevel, a
microlevel, or perhaps both.
A macrolevel analysis of the dispute resolution mechanisms in the nearly 2500 investment treaties would be a rather
significant undertaking.144 It could reveal useful information
about patterns and variations in dispute resolution that would
place specific dispute resolution mechanisms in a global context. UNCTAD’s analysis of variations in investment treaty
provisions is a useful step in this direction.145
139. See, e.g., Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
[SCC Inst.], Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, art. 2 (2007), available at http://www.sccinstitute
.com/_upload/shared_files/regler/2007_Arbitration_Rules_eng.pdf (establishing
the requirements for a claimant’s request for arbitration); Int’l Bank for Reconstr. Dev., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 36, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524, 536
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (establishing the requirements of a request for
arbitration); ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, arts. 1–3 (establishing the requirements of a request for arbitration); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Decision on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 18,
Apr. 28, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 701, 708 [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Rules] (providing
for a claimant to file a statement of claim).
140. UNCITRAL, Rules, supra note 139.
141. Under the ICSID Convention, parties can agree on the appointment of
the president of the tribunal. ICSID Convention, supra note 139, art. 37(2). By
contrast, under ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, the party-appointed arbitrators agree on the appointment of the Chair. UNCITRAL, Rules, supra note
139, art. 7(1).
142. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Rules, supra note 139, art. 15. While this has
historically occurred in private, with a push towards enhanced transparency
in the dispute resolution process, more of the arbitration process is accessible
to the public. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1544–45.
143. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1543–45; Franck, supra note 6, at 55.
144. See Jason W. Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study
of Bilateral Investment Treaties 12–17 (May 2006) (working paper, available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=903680) (providing an
empirical analysis of dispute resolution provisions of 1000 investment treaties).
145. See generally UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995–
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A microlevel analysis would involve analyzing a state’s
specific dispute resolution obligations. For example, Argentina
might engage in two types of analysis. First, it might analyze
the treaty between Argentina and France, which has been the
subject of arbitration.146 Second, it might consult treaties with
its other counter-parties. Having contextualized their own procedures, Argentina would be able to better assess the utility of
its dispute resolution systems.
D. USING DSD: ANALYZING THE UTILITY OF THE CURRENT
SYSTEM
DSD necessitates a deconstruction of existing processes in
light of the actual conflicts to determine what is effective and
what is inefficient.147 In the investment treaty context, DSD
might usefully examine the utility, costs, and benefits of the existing two-tier system.148
1. First-Tier Dispute Resolution: Nonbinding Methods
There are a variety of difficulties related to the first tier of
the process. Most of the problems are likely to result from the
use of “amicable resolution” of disputes or difficulties related to
communicating about conflict.
a. Difficulties with “Amicable Resolution”
The reference to the “amicable resolution” of disputes exhibits a variety of potential problems. First, there is a lack of
clarity and consensus about the need to require, recommend, or
even mention nonbinding forms of dispute resolution in in-

2006:
TRENDS
IN
INVESTMENT
RULEMAKING,
U.N.
Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16 (2006), available at http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf.
146. Décret n˚ 93-834 du 28 mai 1993 portant publication de l’accord entre
le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République Argentine sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements (ensemble une déclaration), Fr.-Arg., July 3, 1991, 1993 Fr. T.S.
8164, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/france_
argentina_fr.pdf.
147. During the stage of determining the mutually acceptable principles
upon which the dispute resolution system should be based, parties can assess
the value of aspects such as fairness, transparency, and precedent.
148. The limited nature of information about investment treaty conflict
necessarily makes this analysis preliminary and tentative. Once further information is available, a reevaluation of the two tiers and overall structure
might provide further insights.
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vestment treaties.149 It is vital to debate the utility of a mandatory versus consensual approach to dispute resolution150 and
consider the availability of different types of dispute resolution.
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity and consensus may adversely
affect parties’ opportunities to discuss possible solutions or
promote alternative settlement opportunities.151 For example,
parties might use the failure to reference or require “amicable
resolution” in the treaty as an excuse to avoid possible conflict
resolution.
Second, it is not clear what process the parties are electing
with the “amicable resolution” methodology. While it presumably refers to a nonbinding process like negotiation or mediation,
this meaning is not typically explained.152 While the lack of
guidance about the process may provide the parties with a degree of flexibility,153 there are nevertheless problems. This may
cause confusion for legal cultures with different dispute resolution traditions154 or working definitions of mediation and other
forms of nonbinding dispute resolution.155
149. See infra note 272 and accompanying text (observing that the United
States has vacillated between mandating and recommending first-tier dispute
resolution).
150. There is debate in investment conflict about the appropriateness of
required versus consensual negotiation. See Coe, supra note 78, at 14–18. This
reflects larger debates in the dispute resolution literature about the challenges
related to mandatory or consensual use of nonbinding dispute resolution mechanisms. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., ADR, supra note 62, at 560–63; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., MEDIATION, supra note 62, at 286–89. See generally
RISKIN ET AL., supra note 3 (discussing the pros and cons of various systems).
151. Presumably, reasonable and rational investors and governments may
have tried to negotiate a settlement prior to the escalation of the conflict. Nevertheless, this is not always an appropriate presumption. Sometimes a resolution cannot be achieved without consulting a different group of decision makers in a different context.
152. See Rubins, supra note 78, at 3. NAFTA is slightly more precise and
requires that “disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim through
consultation or negotiation.” NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1118. It does not define what consultation should or must entail. Id.
153. One might argue it is better to leave the terms of amicable resolution
as broad and undefined as possible. But where parties are in the middle of a
conflict and there may be tactical advantages to delaying or foreclosing certain
dispute resolution methods, the parties may spend energy disputing the dispute resolution method rather than resolving the underlying dispute. A clear
set of dispute resolution procedures has critical systematic efficiencies in these
circumstances.
154. A classic example of cultural and linguistic misunderstanding was
made in the Iran-United States hostage crisis. “[I]n Persian, the word ‘compromise’ apparently lacks the positive meaning it has in English of ‘a midway
solution both sides can live with,’ but has only a negative meaning as in ‘her
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Third, it can be unclear what affirmative obligations may
exist in connection with the dispute resolution method. This
may create difficulties, for example, where one party presumes
there must be “good faith” in this aspect of the dispute resolution process, but another party disagrees with this obligation or
has a different understanding of what it means to bargain “in
good faith.”156
virtue was compromised’ or ‘our integrity was compromised.’ Similarly, the
word ‘mediator’ in Persian suggests ‘meddler,’ someone who is barging in uninvited. In early 1980 U.N. Secretary General Waldheim flew to Iran to deal
with the hostage question. His efforts were seriously set back when Iranian
national radio and television broadcast in Persian a remark he reportedly
made on his arrival in Tehran: ‘I have come as a mediator to work out a compromise.’ Within an hour of the broadcast, his car was being stoned by angry
Iranians.” ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 34 (1981) (emphasis in original).
155. Amy Cohen explains that in western traditions “mediation is a fixed,
bounded, and determinate set of institutional practices to resolve conflict that
are, at all times, informal (dissociated from the state), private, neutral, and
non-coercive. Any analysis of mediation in developing countries, however, reveals a set of institutional practices that are far more complex than this assumption allows. Mediation changes as it travels . . . .” Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal,
11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 295, 296 (2006). In Japan, even though its civil procedure system is nearly identical to Germany’s, the mediation experience is
quite different from many Western countries. Katja Funken, Comparative
Dispute Management: Court-Connected Mediation in Japan and Germany, 3
GERMAN L.J. ¶ 2 (2002), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=
130. Prior to the Law Concerning Promotion and Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (Law No. 151 of 2004), Japanese court-connected mediation included many unique features, such as the following: (1) Japanese courts appointed a mediation committee composed of a judge and two non-judge mediators, (2) mediators had the status of government employees and “female
mediators hired by the family courts [were] housewives,” (3) the mediation
committee could ask interested persons to attend the mediation irrespective of
party agreement, (4) parties met with mediators individually and did not negotiate directly on the theory that “negative emotions will burst out . . . [and
violate] the court’s dignity and make it more difficult to reach an agreement,”
(5) mediators had the power to examine witnesses and procure expert opinions, and (6) mediation agreements were enforceable as court judgments, unless the court deemed it is contrary to law or public policy. Id. ¶¶ 8–13, 24–29.
The new law was scheduled to become effective before June 2007 to set out
principles for ADR and introduce government certificates for ADR service providers. Hiroyuki Tezekua & Yoko Maeda, Japan: Recent Developments in ADR
Law, 1 MEDIATION NEWSL. (Int’l Bar Assoc., London, U.K.), Apr. 2005, at 23–
25.
156. Referring to the Tradex case, UNCTAD suggests that “the obligation
to negotiate and consult before initiating the other means of dispute settlement is not to be taken lightly: it is an obligation of substance and context.
The parties to the dispute must negotiate in good faith.” UNCTAD, INVESTORSTATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 127, at 24. Unfortunately, the cited

FRANCK_6FMT

198

12/13/2007 9:08 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:161

Fourth, despite a textual obligation to “cool off ” or negotiate disputes, arbitrators have not enforced these obligations.157 Instead, tribunals let investors proceed to arbitration
without fulfilling the preconditions.158 Ultimately, the failure to
articulate mutual expectations, the lack of substantive parameters, and an unwillingness to enforce these provisions leaves
this “amicable resolution” methodology with much confusion
and little force.159
Given the generally confidential nature of investment treaty dispute resolution, it is difficult to isolate those factors that
actively affect parties’ decisions to resolve cases prior to the
submission of a request for arbitration.160 Although ICSID’s arbitration docket and anecdotal evidence suggest that settlements occur,161 there is little empirical evidence describing settlement rates generally, let alone whether settlements were
authority does not support the argument. Rather, in a case involving a national investment law and not an investment treaty, Tradex holds that an investor
sending the government a series of letters made a “sufficient good faith effort
to reach an amicable settlement.” It did not address whether there was a general obligation to bargain in good faith under international law or whether the
respondent’s failure to answer the letters constituted a breach of a “good faith”
bargaining obligation. Tradex Helles S.A. v. Albania, No. ARB/94/2, 14 ICSID
REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 161, 182–84 (1999).
157. See Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods,
Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 231, 231–
39 (2004) (discussing several cases in which the respective presiding tribunal
elected not to enforce the applicable waiting period).
158. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M 700, 729 (UNCITRAL 1999)
(permitting arbitration to proceed where an investor waited five days—instead
of the required six months—to initiate arbitration).
159. The only parameter typically provided is a time limit on how long the
undefined period must continue. See Schreuer, supra note 157, at 232 (quoting
Article 11 of the German Model BIT wherein the only articulated parameter of
the waiting period is its duration).
160. Factors might include the availability and clarity of nonbinding dispute resolution mechanisms, a change in corporate ownership or government
control, the size of the dispute, the ease of redressing the conflict, the public
perception of the conflict, and the availability of dispute resolution professionals to provide effective advice about the process of resolving the conflict and its
potential implications.
161. See ICSID Pending Cases, supra note 100; ICSID, List of Concluded
Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2007) [hereinafter ICSID Concluded Cases] (reflecting settlements in investment treaty cases such as AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hung., Lemire v.
Ukraine, and Goetz v. Burundi); Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 12 (noting
the “increasing percentage of ICSID [arbitration] cases that are discontinued
following settlement”); see also Coe, supra note 78, at 29–30 (commenting on
the settlement in an ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration in the Ethyl Corp. v. Canada dispute).
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influenced by the “amicable resolution” obligation.162 In its current format, the process’s efficacy is uncertain.
b. Difficulties Communicating the Existence of Disputes
Stakeholders could also use DSD to analyze the efficacy of
dispute resolution notifications. Theoretically, the process of
alerting governments to the existence of conflicts or submitting
an official dispute notice should be straightforward. Nevertheless, there are special challenges indigenous to investment
treaty conflict that should be considered in the design of a system. These challenges relate primarily to the structures governments may have in place to resolve treaty-related conflict.
First, although treaties might require investors to provide
the host government with a dispute notice, they often do not
specify to whom it should be sent. This lack of clarity can frustrate the ability to use first-tier dispute resolution effectively.163 One can easily imagine the frustration of trying to resolve
a dispute amicably but not knowing whom to contact about beginning or completing that process.
This problem is compounded where host governments have
not determined what agencies are responsible for managing investment treaty conflict.164 Indeed, where the chain of command has not been specified in advance, it is likely that there

162. Empirical analysis into this issue would be helpful, particularly if it
could isolate variables affecting settlement. Factors might include (1) the type
of the claim, (2) the text of the treaty, (3) the existence of cases involving similar facts or the same or similar treaty obligations, (4) the relationship between
the signatories to the treaty, (5) the availability of political risk insurance or
foreign aid, (6) a change of government, (7) the number of government agencies involved, (8) the nationality or background of the arbitrators, and (9) the
likely cost of pursuing arbitration and the possibility of shifting the costs.
163. See Carlos Ramos Miranda, Legal Issues in the Regulation of Water
Supply in Mexico, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 75, 81 (2003) (referring to difficulties related to a lack of clarity with contractual provisions such as dispute resolution); Linda Stamato, Easier Said Than Done: Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in
Policy and Practice, 1994 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 83 (referring to confusion caused
by a “lack of clarity at the policy level about the goals and benefits of dispute
resolution processes”); see also Franck, supra note 11, at 1588 n.335 (referring
to difficulties related to NAFTA’s lack of clarity).
164. Cf. Kirk Blackard, Assessing Workplace Conflict Resolution Options,
DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2001, at 57, 60 (2001) (suggesting that an effective
dispute resolution system addresses issues of poor communication); Richard J.
Erickson, The Making of Executive Agreements by the United States Department of Defense: An Agenda for Progress, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 45, 84 n.180 (1995)
(discussing the implications of an inability to create a binding resolution in
state-to-state disputes).
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will be internal government conflict about which agency—each
with different political mandates and objectives—will control
and pay for the dispute resolution process.165 Tensions can also
increase when government officials who are not responsible for
or interested in the dispute rebuff or ignore investors.166 Frustration and other difficulties might also result from investors
bargaining with officials who lack actual financial, legal, or political authority to resolve the dispute.167
A second difficulty involves the role of subnational units.
Investment treaty conflict can arise as a result of conduct by
governmental subdivisions such as governors, state assemblies,
and town councils.168 Where there is poor communication
among these subdivisions and national units, it may be challenging to engage in effective dispute resolution prior to the
submission of a request for arbitration. Dispute notices may be
mistakenly sent to subdivisions that do not know how to act
upon them, or a national government may learn of the difficulties for the first time upon receiving a request for arbitration.
Either of these scenarios will mean that the national government cannot utilize first-tier dispute resolution effectively.
Ultimately these difficulties do not mean that the use of
dispute notices and nonbinding dispute resolution such as “amicable settlement” is inappropriate.169 Rather, using DSD to
analyze the costs and benefits of these methods would create an

165. Theoretically, different agencies, such as those in charge of administering justice, intergovernmental political affairs, international trade, or a
specific investment sector (e.g., energy), may be available and interested in
controlling the resolution of government disputes.
166. See Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?:
Developing the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 193, 197 (2001) (observing that the “whims of individual bureaucrats
may cause a government to downgrade, or even ignore, meritorious claims”).
167. See generally Legum, supra note 78 (illustrating the complexity of
multiple agencies’ simultaneous involvement in settlements); Rubins, supra
note 78 (noting the factors that affect the ability of government officials to facilitate settlement).
168. Jeswald Salacuse, Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, InvestorState Dispute Resolution 11 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). This may create difficulties for subnational units that may not recognize
that their conduct may create an international law violation.
169. There is literature indicating that mediation and other forms of nonbinding dispute resolution might be effective in the international context. See,
e.g., WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS’ PROTECTORS IN
NINE COUNTRIES (1967); RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
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opportunity to ensure that the processes function more effectively for the system’s stakeholders.
2. Second-Tier Dispute Resolution
The prevalence of arbitration provisions and the apparent
structural inclination towards arbitration indicate a presumption that arbitration is the “best” mechanism for resolving treaty disputes.170 Scholars even suggest that countries realized
“that their self-interest was served by agreeing to arbitrate investment disputes.”171
Nevertheless, arbitration is only one of many dispute resolution choices,172 and it “would be a misperception to believe
that all the disputes related to foreign direct investment can be
referred to international arbitration.”173 Other dispute resolution options, binding or nonbinding, may provide critical opportunities to resolve disputes more efficiently.174 Unfortunately,
there has been little empirical enquiry into the validity of arbitration’s presumed superiority, let alone a coherent explanation
of why other dispute resolution systems175 are less desirable.176
170. The basis for this historical preference is unclear. While not a comprehensive or empirical assessment of all international dispute resolution,
traditional texts appear to extol the benefit of arbitration and appear to reference more cases being resolved by arbitration than by other formats. See, e.g.,
MERRILLS, supra note 44, at 92–126.
171. Alvarez & Park, supra note 110, at 368.
172. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 37–41; see also Groton,
supra note 65, at 4 (“Experience has shown that no single dispute resolution
technique, regardless of how good it is, can be used for all disputes, or for different stages of the same dispute. The causes of disputes come from so many
different sources and are so complex that there is no ‘one size fits all’ technique for dispute resolution.”).
173. Alfred Escher, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 19, at 42.
174. The classic formulation is that the “forum [should fit] the fuss.” Sander & Goldberg, supra note 123, at 49.
175. Costantino and Merchant identify six broad categories of alternative
dispute resolution options—namely Preventative, Negotiated, Facilitative,
Fact-Finding, Advisory, and Imposed ADR. Each category involves varying
levels of third-party intervention, ranging from heavy involvement to no involvement, and each category has its own distinct costs and benefits. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 37–41.
176. This phenomenon may not be unique to investment treaty disputes.
For example, the OECD recently proposed the use of arbitration to resolve
disputes arising in connection with international tax treaties. See generally
CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & ADMIN., OECD, PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING MECHANISMS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY DISPUTES (2006), http://www.oecd
.org/dataoecd/5/20/36054823.pdf (outlining an arbitration process for resolving
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a. Understanding the Choice for Arbitration
The trend towards arbitration, despite its corresponding
lack of reliance on other effective dispute resolution mechanisms,177 is not completely surprising. The first investment treaties were negotiated in the 1960s and 1970s, and many countries developed model investment treaties around the same
time that served as the basis for future negotiations.178 Notably, these paradigms were developed prior to the “ADR Revolution” in the United States in the 1970s and the development of
DSD literature in the late 1980s.179 Curiously, even during the
surge of treaty drafting during the 1990s,180 drafters performed
little or no analysis of why arbitration is the preferred or appropriate method for resolving disputes. No one justified the
exclusion of other methods.181
There are various explanations for this phenomenon. First,
during the 1980s and 1990s, the resolution of investment treaty
conflict was largely untested. As a result, there was little evidence that the system was managing conflict inefficiently and
little need to evaluate the status quo. Second, as countries continued to negotiate treaties based on established formats for
international tax disputes). But see Allison Christians, Taxing the Global
Worker: Three Spheres of International Social Security Coordination, 26 VA.
TAX REV. 81, 118 (2006) (noting the development of “[a] new arbitration mechanism” by the OECD, but also mentioning the OECD position “that arbitration is to be used only in those ‘rare cases’” wherein timely resolution is unlikely); Michael J. McIntyre, Comments on the OECD Proposal for Secret and
Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 622,
623–47 (2006) (critiquing the OECD’s arbitration proposals).
177. See Franck, supra note 13 (discussing the increase in the number of
investment treaty arbitration awards over time).
178. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 167–253 (providing model
investment treaties for Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States); UNCTAD, BITs,
supra note 4 (demonstrating the increase in BITs since 1959).
179. Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It
Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 289 (2003). It has taken longer for
the benefits of ADR and DSD to find a home in Europe. David J.A. Cairns,
Mediating International Commercial Disputes: Differences in U.S. and European Approaches, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.–Sept. 2005, at 62, 64–68; Francisco
Orrego Vicuña, Arbitration in a New International Alternative Dispute Resolution System, 18(2) ICSID NEWS (2001), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/
n-18-2-1.htm.
180. UNCTAD, BITs, supra note 4.
181. One likely explanation for this is that dispute resolution theorists and
investment treaty specialists were not engaged in a dialogue that recognized
and drew upon their overlapping strengths and interests. This article is intended to be the first step towards promoting a broader dialogue.
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conflict resolution, institutional momentum likely prevented alterations to the traditional format.182 Any departures would
likely have required significant internal justification.183 Third,
as the judicialization of investment rights marked a major departure from traditional diplomatic protection, investors may
have been uncomfortable advocating for a conflict management
system that might reincorporate aspects of negotiation. Without evidence that interest-based methods of dispute resolution
could be used to successfully resolve disputes with host governments, investors may have been unwilling to break new
ground when millions of dollars were potentially at stake.184
Fourth, there might have been political disincentive for governments to take responsibility for their conduct when it might
be politically expedient, for example, to hold an arbitral tribunal responsible for a particular result.185
182. See UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995–2006: TRENDS
INVESTMENT RULEMAKING at 141, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2006/5,
U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16 (2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
iteiia20065_en.pdf (observing the similarity in terms of investment treaties,
but stating that a “relatively small, but increasing, group of BITs have started
to introduce some innovations”).
183. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605–
14 (2001) (discussing path dependence in common law systems and observing
that these can result in legal decisions that are “locked-in” at an early stage).
184. Lawyers might be psychologically averse to recommending nontraditional dispute resolution to clients. Lawyers may be more comfortable
with arbitration—which has similarities to litigation and other adversarial
dispute resolution methods taught in law schools. They may be less inclined to
engage in other methods such as interest-based negotiation, mediation, or
fact-finding. Lawyers may, for example, have difficulty estimating risk and
providing advice about processes with which they have less experience. Larger
financial exposures may magnify this risk and create an incentive for adherence to existing processes that are tried, tested, and capable of facilitating better risk assessment. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43
OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 44–45 (1982) (discussing the lawyer’s “philosophical map”);
Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions
of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002) (observing that lawyers’ preconceptions,
experiences, and biases mean they “often miss opportunities for uncovering
and addressing their clients’ real needs”); see also Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer’s
Philosophical Map and the Disputant’s Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145, 149–50 (2001)
(discussing the characteristics of lawyers and the perceptions of disputants in
the context of mediation).
185. See Todd Allee & Paul K. Huth, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Adjudication as Domestic Political Cover, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
219, 219 (2006) (“[L]eaders will seek legal dispute settlement in situations
where they anticipate sizeable domestic political costs should they attempt to
IN
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Beyond these practical explanations, there are undoubtedly important legal reasons why arbitration is a primary mechanism for resolving investment treaty conflict. Arbitration has
institutional legitimacy because it is associated with a tried
and tested dispute resolution process.186 The arbitration
process relies on functioning international law regimes such as
the New York and ICSID Conventions, which provide streamlined enforcement mechanisms.187 Beyond this, a variety of
practical legal realities—such as the ability to choose neutral
decision makers with subject matter expertise and an experienced arbitration bar—made arbitration historically desirable
in the international commercial context.188 Ultimately, investment treaty arbitration has resolved disputes, and after exhausting contested awards through the normal legal process,
parties have generally paid awards.189 These factors cannot and
should not be discounted.
b. The Challenge and Costs
Simply because we can use arbitration does not mean that
we always should. Just as a physician who diagnoses a patient
with a heart arrhythmia does not recommend a quadruple bypass without considering a range of less intrusive or more efficient options, a different system of resolving investment disputes may effectively address the diagnosed problems with
fewer complications than arbitration.190 The failure to engage
settle a dispute through the making of bilateral, negotiated concessions.”); Salacuse, supra note 168, at 14 (“[H]ost government officials can blame any unfavorable result on three foreign arbitrators, thereby shifting responsibility
away from the host government itself.”).
186. Other investment-related claims have been successfully resolved using
international arbitration, including the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the Alabama Claims Commission. See MERRILLS, supra note 44, at 92–95, 101–03.
187. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517; ICSID Convention, supra note 139.
188. The benefits of other aspects of international commercial arbitration
are less certain in the investment treaty context. It is not clear that investment treaty arbitration is the most cost-efficient and timely manner of resolving disputes. Likewise, the confidentiality that is often desirable in the international commercial context may be a drawback in the investment context
where public rights granted by public actors are at stake.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
190. UNCTAD observed that the “settlement of any dispute, not just investment disputes, requires the adoption of the most speedy, informal, amicable and inexpensive method available.” UNCTAD, Recent Developments, supra
note 9, at 11. Finding the most “appropriate” mechanism for resolving specific
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in diagnosis and systematic analysis to recalibrate the system
will have costs.
Obvious costs relate to process inefficiencies. The presumption that arbitration is the one-size-fits-all model for dispute
resolution prevents exploration of other options that may be
speedier, cheaper, or simply better at maximizing party control
and satisfaction with the process and result.191 Moreover, the
availability of an arbitration mechanism does not prevent parties from engaging in more traditional dispute resolution, such
as the exercise of power. For example, in Lemire v. Ukraine,
Mr. Lemire testified before Congress that, after filing his request for arbitration, there was “tremendous retaliation . . . [including] investigations, and just last week, we had armed
guards come to our offices as well as—on Friday we had our
bank accounts frozen. On Thursday of last week, our offices
were surrounded with armed guards with sub-machine
guns.”192
There may also be hidden costs that inhibit conflict resolution. By placing undue reliance on arbitration, there may be
categories of simmering conflict that have not become formal
disputes but are nevertheless important to address. For example, unresolved treaty conflicts may provide a disincentive to
investors considering initial or further investments in the host
country. Bringing investment arbitration may be cost prohibitive,193 particularly for small investors whose rights have been
categories of types of investment disputes, however, can be challenging. Nevertheless, there are decided benefits to tailoring a dispute resolution design to
the unique needs of the particular system. These values might include the
promotion of democratic values, minimizing resources exerted on dispute resolution, increasing productivity, increasing satisfaction with outcomes, decreasing the recurrence of disputes, and improving public relations. E.g., URY ET
AL., supra note 65, at 169–73; Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
11, 13–14 (2005) (discussing the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in the
modern workplace that foster democratic governance).
191. See infra Part IV (identifying the benefits of DSD).
192. Foreign Operations, supra note 107; see also id. at 392 (stating a concert manager was “severely beaten in the face when the U.S. government
stepped in on [Gala Radio’s] behalf . . . [; t]wo days after that, one of our dj’s
had her flat set on fire,” and providing pictures).
193. At present, there is no comprehensive analysis of the actual cost of
bringing or defending an investment arbitration claim. This is due in part to
the unavailability of the data necessary for such an analysis—namely a specific articulation of the parties’ legal costs and the tribunal’s costs and expenses.
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the costs of these claims are
not insignificant. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1592 (noting that an invest-
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violated where the arbitration costs may be larger than the potential damages.194 This limitation on a party’s access to dispute resolution is troubling because other mechanisms could
provide cost-effective redress. This has implications for investors who are unable to justify bringing a claim or governments
who face challenges (financial or otherwise) in defending
claims.195
Beyond this, arbitration has the capacity to exclude those
impacted by the result from the dispute resolution process. This
can have serious ramifications. Members of the public who feel
disenfranchised—whether they are unable to participate in the
proceedings, attend the proceedings, or have access to the underlying documents—may respond in ways that increase the
social, political, or economic costs of conflict.196 This can serve
ment treaty claim may cost $1 million per year and gathering comments suggesting that costs could be in the $1–4 million range); see also UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 8–10 (observing that a “cursory review of cost decisions
in recent awards suggests that the average legal costs incurred by Governments are between $1 million and $2 million, including lawyers’ fees, the costs
for the tribunal [are] about $400,000 or more, and the costs for the claimants
. . . are about the same as those for the defendant,” and observing that the investor in Metalclad spent $4 million in bringing its claim and the Czech government has spent nearly $17 million in two years defending claims); Franck,
supra note 13 (discussing the tribunal’s average costs and expenses and the
amount of the parties’ legal costs, while acknowledging the limited nature of
the empirical data).
194. The decision to bring a claim is in the hands of investors who may
bring a claim irrespective of the economic benefit. In litigation related to an
investment treaty arbitration, a party brought a claim before a New York
court to enforce a $23.35 million arbitration award even though there were
only five cents in an account to secure the debt. CME Media Enters. B.V. v.
Zelezny, No. 01-CV-1733-DC, 2001 WL 1035138, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
2001).
195. See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal
Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 250–60 (2007) (providing evidence of the difficulties
host governments can face when defending investment treaty claims, such as
access to the law, due to a lack of financial resources and basic infrastructure).
196. As a result of concerns related to the lack of transparency in arbitration, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have advocated reforms to increase public access to information. See generally HOWARD MANN, PRIVATE
RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA’S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER
ON
INVESTOR RIGHTS (2001), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
trade_citizensguide.pdf. Some inroads have been made on this issue. Franck,
supra note 6, at 87–88. Two countries, the United States and Canada, have
changed their model investment treaties to permit public access under appropriate circumstances. Id. at 91. Meanwhile, ICSID changed its arbitration
rules to permit public access in limited circumstances. ICSID CONVENTION
RULES, supra note 83, at 115, 117, 122 (permitting the attendance and sub-
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as a magnet for social or political unrest and possibly affect the
case outcome.
In Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, United States and Spanish
investors claimed there was an expropriation of their concession to provide water and sewer services in Cochabamba, Bolivia.197 As a result of the public interest and protests related to
the case, more than three hundred organizations from fortythree countries asked to participate but were denied.198 Interest
groups put pressure on the investor to drop the case, complaining about these “secretive” proceedings.199 The case eventually
settled200 without the investors receiving compensation from
Bolivia.201
IV. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DSD
Concerns about efficacy, transparency, consistency, fairness, and regulatory authority of the current two-tier approach
are unlikely to be ameliorated just by choosing a different dispute resolution system. Without careful consideration, the
missions by non-parties under limited circumstances and permitting publication of extracts of awards under Arbitration Rules 32(2), 37(2), and 48(4), effective April 10, 2006); ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, at
61–62, 67 (describing Rules 39(2), 41(3), and 53). There are nevertheless interesting contradictions. For example, under the ICSID Rules, a member of the
public may attend a hearing, but she cannot obtain a transcript without consent of both parties. See id. at 40, 42 (permitting persons other than the parties to attend hearings under Article 34, but Article 39 makes no mention of
the availability of reports to nonparties).
197. See OLIVERA WITH LEWIS, supra note 60 (referring to negotiations during Bolivia’s “Water Wars”).
198. Petition to the Arbitral Tribunal, La Coordinadora para la Defensa del
Agua y Vida, No. ARB/02/3 (Aug. 29, 2002), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Aguaaboliviapetition.pdf; Franck, supra note 6, at 90 n.163; Letter from Prof.
David F. Caron, President of the Tribunal in the Matter of Aguas del Tunari v.
Bolivia, to J. Martin Wagner, Director, Int’l Program, Earthjustice (Jan. 29,
2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Aguas-BoliviaResponse
.pdf.
199. See generally Press Release, Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law, Secretive World
Bank Tribunal Bans Public and Media Participation in Bechtel Lawsuit over
Access to Water (Feb. 12, 2003), http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/Bechtel_Lawsuit_
12Feb03.html; Jim Shultz, Bechtel Vs. Bolivia: The People Win!!, THE DEMOCRACY CENTER ON-LINE, Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0601/
S00159.htm.
200. ICSID Concluded Cases, supra note 161; see also Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 130, at 23 (noting that a foreign investor “eventually
dropped the [ICSID] case against Guyana in light of continued public opposition”).
201. Press Release, Bechtel, Cochabamba Water Dispute Settled (Jan. 19,
2006), http://www.bechtel.com/newsarticles/487.asp.
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same issues may simply manifest themselves in a different fashion. Purifying the waters of investment-related conflict
should be the goal. Systematic diagnosis through DSD is a tool
to begin this process.
In the same way that a one-size-fits-all dispute resolution
system may be inappropriate, it is possible that using DSD to
manage conflict and create disputing systems might not be appropriate for all situations.202 Prior to making that individualized determination, however, it would be prudent to consider
the general costs and benefits of using DSD to manage investment treaty-related conflict.
A. BENEFITS
DSD can benefit the management of investment treaty conflict. First, the objective of DSD is to improve the quality and
efficiency of the process of resolving disputes.203 In the context
of investment treaty disputes, this can occur through considering the types of disputes likely to arise under the treaty, improving the process’s efficiency once disputes are formalized by
tailoring the design to meet the system’s unique needs, and
managing conflict before disputes crystallize. These steps may
provide opportunities to assist UNCTAD’s objective of strengthening institutional capacities to manage investor-state disputes in a more cost-effective manner.204
1. Efficient Administration of Existing Disputes
Past experience in the domestic and multinational context
suggests that once a formal dispute exists, DSD can provide
opportunities to decrease the social, political, and financial
costs of managing conflict.205 In the investment context, the
benefits may be as simple as (1) paying decreased attorneys
fees, (2) eliminating the need to pay arbitrators for their services, (3) permitting investors to focus on their core business activ-

202. See STITT, supra note 43, at 9 (recognizing that dispute resolution is
often an individual process and that “cookie-cutter” solutions can be inappropriate).
203. See id. (describing that ADR system design values cost efficiency);
COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 46 (listing the six principles of
DSD); URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 42–46 (describing the six principles of
DSD and providing examples).
204. UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 61.
205. See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text (identifying the historical evolution of DSD).
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ities, (4) letting governments focus upon the process of governing their citizens, and (5) increasing party control to create solutions that enhance satisfaction with the result.
While the first four are straightforward, the fifth benefit
can be demonstrated by example. Lemire v. Ukraine involved a
dispute about radio broadcasting.206 Ukraine did pay damages,
but it promised to (1) “examine the quality of broadcasting . . .
[and] take necessary, reasonable among others, technical
measures to remove the obstacles (if any) for radio broadcasting
of Gala Radio” and (2) use its “best possible efforts to consider
in a positive way the application of Gala Radio to provide it
with the licenses for radio frequencies.”207 A solution addressing the station’s broadcasting needs is not surprising because
the conflict was about the station’s capacity to broadcast.
The final aspect of the settlement was a bit more unusual.
Ukraine also promised to provide “three locations for the beauty salon.”208 At first blush, it is unclear what, if anything, beauty salons have to do with a radio broadcasting investment.209
Nevertheless, this term of the settlement agreement permitted
the parties to achieve their shared underlying interests. Perhaps more interestingly, this creative solution was within the
parties’ control. It is unlikely that courts or arbitral tribunals
could order relief on matters beyond the scope of the dispute articulated in the pleadings.210
206. Lemire v. Ukraine, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 530 (2000),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemire-Award.pdf.
207. Id. at 535–36.
208. Id. at 536.
209. While the confidential nature of the case makes it difficult to determine, Mr. Lemire’s congressional testimony suggests that there is a relationship between his enterprises and the Oksana Baiul Beauty Salons. See Foreign Operations, supra note 107, at 391 (observing that Lemire is affiliated
with Olympic Champions, Ltd., which has involvement with Oksana Baiul and
a beauty salon that Mr. Lemire alleged was “completely expropriated in January of 1997 after refusing to pay a bribe”). If this relationship exists and the
beauty salons were related to his larger foreign investment strategy (i.e., “deal
swapping” one investment for another), this presumably explains part of the
settlement terms.
210. After this Article was drafted, Lemire initiated another ICSID arbitration against Ukraine. Lemire v. Ukraine, No. ARB/06/18, available at ICSID Pending Cases, supra note 100, at 31. Commentary suggests the case involves alleged breaches of the previous settlement agreement as well as new
breaches of the U.S./Ukraine BIT. Luke Eric Peterson, US Investor Invokes
BIT to Sue Ukraine over Broadcasting Quotas and Licensing, INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Can.),
Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_oct13_2006.pdf; see also Lemire
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Building procedural opportunities to capitalize on other
types of dispute resolution—such as the negotiation in Lemire—could be useful. There is some institutional support in
place to facilitate access to non-arbitration-based dispute resolution. For instance, ICSID has a conciliation facility,211 but it
has only been used six times.212 Counsel for ICSID notes that
“the Centre has recently begun to remind parties of the existence of the [conciliation] mechanism.”213 ICSID also has a factfinding facility,214 which has never been used since its inception
v. Ukraine, No. ARB/06/18, available at ICSID Pending Cases, supra note 100,
at 31. Planting the seeds of later conflict in the resolution of an initial dispute
is not unique to investment treaty conflict. Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Ecuador resulted in an arbitration award. Occidental Exploration &
Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, No. UN 3467, 2004 WL 3267260, at *72–74 (UNCITRAL
July 1, 2004). Conflict has arisen about that particular case, and Occidental
filed a new claim. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, No. ARB/06/11,
Decision on Provisional Measures, available at http://www.worldbank
.org/icsid/cases/pdf/Occidental_Decision_on_Provisional_Measures_August_
17_2007.pdf; ICSID Pending Cases, supra note 100.
211. ICSID CONVENTION RULES, supra note 83, at 12. ICSID’s conciliation
functions like a nonbinding arbitration or highly formalized, evaluative mediation. The Conciliation Commission has powers to (1) at any time, “recommend that the parties accept specific terms of settlement or that they refrain . . . from specific acts that might aggravate the dispute [and] point out to
the parties the arguments in favor of its recommendations,” (2) request written statements from the parties, (3) rule on its own jurisdiction, (4) rule on requests to disqualify conciliators, (5) hold hearings and take evidence in the
form of documents or witness testimony, and (6) issue a report at the closure
of the proceedings. Id. at 89–97.
212. ICSID has only registered six conciliations: (1) Shareholders of SESAM v. Central African Republic, No. CONC/07/01, (2) SEDITEX Eng’g Beratungsgesellschaft für die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. Madagascar, No.
CONC/82/1, (3), Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Trinidad and Tobago, No.
CONC/83/1, (4) SEDITEX Eng’g Beratungsgesellschaft für die Textilindustrie
m.b.H. v. Madagascar, No. CONC/94/1, (5) TG World Petroleum Ltd. v. Niger,
No. CONC/03/1, and (6) Togo Electricité v. Togo, No. CONC/05/1). ICSID
Pending Cases, supra note 100; ICSID Concluded Cases, supra note 161; see
also Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 13–14 (noting the limited use of ICSID’s
conciliation mechanism). Given the confidential nature of ICSID’s docket,
these may not all be investment treaty cases.
213. Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 13.
214. ICSID, Additional Facility Rules for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration, and Fact-Finding Proceedings, at vi (Jan. 2003), http://
worldbank.com/icsid/facility-archive/facility-en.htm [hereinafter, ICSID FactFinding]. Either an investor or a government can initiate a fact-finding proceeding to examine and report on facts. ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES,
supra note 83, at 16. Provided both parties consent, a committee will be established to provide the parties with an impartial assessment of facts which, if
accepted by them, resolve a conflict about specific factual issues. See id. at 16–
18; ICSID Fact-Finding, supra. The Rules envisage that there will be oral proceedings, written submissions, evidence, witness testimony, and a report that
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in 1978.215 Parties may hesitate to use relatively untried or relatively untested dispute resolution mechanisms. ICSID, however, currently lacks a facility to promote the use of negotiation, mediation (whether through the use of ombuds or
otherwise), or other nonbinding dispute resolution processes.216
Making parties aware of and improving the existing facilities are part of the challenge of designing useful dispute systems.217 There may also be challenges in providing access to institutions or convincing parties to use other dispute resolution
processes that may not be associated with existing institutions.218 Other challenges may involve educating stakeholders
about the value of other forms of dispute resolution, including
interest-based dispute resolution, and providing training to
lawyers and parties about how to utilize each option effectively.
DSD provides an opportunity to maximize efficiency and stakeholder satisfaction by assessing the suitability of dispute resolution options based upon the nature of conflicts and the unique
context of the system’s stakeholders.

“shall be limited to findings of fact [and] shall not contain any recommendations to the parties nor shall it have the character of an award,” and the parties will be “entirely free as to the effect to be given to the Report.” ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, at 20–22.
215. Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 13.
216. See ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, at 5 (noting
that ICSID only has facilities for arbitration, conciliation, and fact-finding).
217. In the 1982 and 1983 U.S. Model BITs, there were references to using
ICSID’s fact-finding facility. Model Treaty Between the United States of
America and [Country] Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-[Country], art. VII(2), Jan. 11, 1982, reprinted in
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY
AND PRACTICE app. A-1 (1992); Model Treaty Between the United States of
America and [Country] Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-[Country], art. VII(2), Jan. 21, 1983, reprinted in
VANDEVELDE, supra, at app. A-2. Interestingly this “explicit reference was
omitted as unnecessary from the 1984 and 1987 drafts.” VANDEVELDE, supra,
at 165.
218. There might be utility in encouraging stakeholders to consider using
other forms of binding dispute resolution with transparent procedures and the
possibility of enforcement. This might involve recourse to a national court or
an international claims commission. See Franck, supra note 6, at 81–82 n.130;
W. Michael Reisman, Control Mechanisms in International Dispute Resolution, 2 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 129, 136–37 (1994); see also Bjorklund, supra note 131,
at 825–27 (describing the use of mixed claims commissions).
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2. Early Management of Conflict
There are benefits to instituting early, preventative conflict
management.219 DSD can be used to normalize conflict and institute measures that prevent its escalation. A redesigned system might create a process that provides “early warning signs”
to prevent the escalation of disputes.220
Some commentators suggest that once a conflict has escalated and investors submit a request for arbitration, there is no
turning back.221 Governments dig in their heels and refuse to
settle, lest there be political fall-out in the future.222 Using DSD
to provide early intervention that normalizes conflict management may depoliticize the dispute resolution, promote legitimacy, and provide early opportunities for both investors and governments to come to mutually acceptable positions.
For instance, there might be utility in setting up an ombuds office to act as a complaint center.223 Ombuds traditionally use a variety of tools to resolve complaints at an early stage
and have historically been used effectively in dealing with public-private disputes.224 They might direct constituents to other
processes or opportunities that may resolve the issues; likewise, they may raise the problem at an appropriate level within
the organization.225
219. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 38–39; STITT, supra note
43, at 2, 10; URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 61, 170–72.
220. See STITT, supra note 43, at 10 (“An organization need not, however,
wait until it is in distress to look for an appropriate dispute resolution. The
best time, in fact, for organizations to look at systems design is before a crisis
has arisen, when conflict has not yet manifested itself.”).
221. See Coe, supra note 78, at 29, 41; Legum, supra note 78, at 25 (“[T]he
best chance to resolve a dispute between a foreign investor and a government
agency is likely before the investment dispute becomes a dispute under an investment treaty.”).
222. See Legum, supra note 78, at 24.
223. Karl Sauvant, Mediation Is the Key for Future Investment, FDI, Apr. 2,
2002, http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/108/Mediation_is_
the_key_for_future_investment.html.
224. Philip J. Harter, Ombuds: A Voice for the People, DISP. RESOL. MAG.
Winter 2005, at 5, 5–6; Harold J. Krent, Federal Agency Ombuds: The Costs,
Benefits and Countenance of Confidentiality, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 18, 20–22
(2000). See generally GELLHORN, supra note 169 (setting out how nine different countries have effectively used ombuds).
225. An ombud is an “officer appointed by the legislature to handle complaints against administrative and judicial action,” serving as a watchdog over
those actions while exercising independence, expertise, impartiality, accessibility, and powers of persuasion rather than control. Shirley A. Wiegand, A
Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model, 12
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Ombuds offices have the benefit of equality where those
who are affected by a conflict have a place to give voice to their
concerns.226 Unlike an investor’s unilateral right to bring
claims to arbitration, investors, citizens, and governmental officials could have theoretical access to the ombuds office for the
filing of complaints.227 This option might also provide practical
benefits by offering a clear line of authority for receiving complaints, providing governmental authority for managing disputes, and lowering the cost of raising issues. This has the benefit of clarifying communication lines and permitting smaller
investors to be heard or smaller conflicts to be addressed. It also facilitates access to justice and decreases the stigma of announcing and quickly resolving disputes.228 Rather than letting
problems fester or creating an intractable dispute, an ombud
provides an official channel that permits stakeholders to address issues informally before ratcheting up the cost and formality of conflict resolution.229 For governments, such an office
creates opportunities to assess and address potential litigation
risks—correcting problems before they worsen—or making informed determinations about how best to manage their policy
choices. For investors, early intervention might provide opportunities to resolve disputes before having to allocate resources
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 95, 98 (1996). Other international law scholars have
also pointed to the importance of a mechanism of this kind. See Sauvant, supra note 223 (“One option to consider is the establishment of an office of investment mediation, to deal with complaints before they turn into conflicts of a
sort that only courts can resolve. The idea is similar to that of an ombudsperson.”).
226. There is evidence that those experiencing disputes seek to voice their
conflict regardless of whether there is a legally cognizable claim. Kathy L.
Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 587 (2002). This
suggests a greater concern for communication than a denial of legal rights.
227. An ombuds office could serve as a conflict barometer. It would alert
governments to where they are most likely to encounter difficulties; with that
information, governments will be in a position to make more informed and rational legislative and regulatory choices. Ombuds might also enhance governmental legitimacy. While ombuds cannot traditionally make government policy, the existence of the office may encourage government officials to support
decisions with clear reasons. Moreover, providing the regulated public with a
direct form of communication and feedback can promote democratic values
and institutional legitimacy. There would, undoubtedly, be important costs to
using ombuds; DSD might usefully consider who best to use this approach.
228. While theoretically it could increase the number of recorded disputes,
this might not mean an increased number of actual disputes but rather an increased reporting of conflict.
229. Wiegand, supra note 225, at 119–21.
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to dispute resolution instead of core commercial activities. For
citizens, it offers an opportunity to voice their concerns.
This type of model is not completely unknown in the international context. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation was designed to help prevent the escalation of potential
trade and environmental conflicts related to NAFTA.230 Something similar may be worth exploring for investment disputes.
Such a model need not exclude access to arbitration, as the use
of ombuds could take various forms. Ombuds might theoretically provide an exclusive dispute resolution mechanism. More
probably, use of ombuds might complement the arbitration
process where it could either be a precondition to arbitration or
used simultaneously with arbitration. Ultimately, the principles upon which stakeholders agree to organize dispute resolution will determine how to use ombuds (if at all). Nevertheless, the benefits of using ombuds to manage conflict at an
early stage are promising.
3. Procedural Justice and Institutional Legitimacy
Beyond these efficiency measures, there are systematic
benefits to engaging in DSD. In particular, reevaluation of the
system through DSD can enhance its institutional legitimacy
and promote procedural justice.
There is a need for procedural fairness in terms of how the
dispute resolution process is created.231 Empirical evidence
suggests that when stakeholders believe a system is procedurally just, they are more likely to buy into the result and the

230. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.Can.-Mex., art. 10(6)(c), Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation,
Who
We
Are,
http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/index.cfm?
varlan=english (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (providing basic information about
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation); see also David. L. Markell,
Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision Making Processes
as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 659 (2006)
(analyzing the Commission for Environmental Cooperation and citizen participation and the implications for procedural justice).
231. See Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2004, at 221, 251 (referring to the importance of the conflict resolution system
design); Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 907 (2002) (suggesting the
importance of stakeholder participation in the design of a dispute resolution
system); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK, supra note 3, at 165, 170 (outlining the potential benefits of
procedural fairness).
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process, comply with the outcome, comply with the law in the
future, increase commitment to the organization, accord respect
and loyalty to the institution, and perceive the system to be legitimate.232 This evidence indicates that the trust in the legal
institution can be more influential than even substantive correctness in determining whether parties will comply with the
law.233
It is useful to consider how best to use these empirical findings to enhance procedural justice.234 Various approaches have
been shown to enhance perceptions of procedural justice, such
as (1) creating chances for the parties to provide input into the
process of resolving disputes, (2) providing an opportunity to
voice each party’s views and concerns, (3) having a third party
consider a party’s views and concerns, and (4) ensuring that
both the process and the third party treat a party in a dignified
and respectful manner.235
232. TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROJUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 77–80
(2000); see also JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 94 (1975) (arguing that the process used in resolving a dispute strongly influences the disputants’ level of satisfaction with the
ultimate resolution); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 82, 107–08
(1990) (reporting research demonstrating that people who are confident that
decision-making procedures are fair are more likely to obey the law); Jeanne
M. Brett & Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance Mediation in the Coal Industry: A
Field Experiment, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 49, 65, 67–68 (1983) (suggesting
that parties value process control because they view it as a means of controlling outcome); William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the
Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 137, 137 (1988) (“We find litigants
are at least as concerned with issues of process as they are with the substantive questions that make up their cases.”); John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and the Federal Income Tax System, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139,
176–77 (2003) (discussing an empirical analysis that confirms that procedural
justice plays a strong role in a party’s willingness to comply with a decision).
These studies may, however, be of limited generalizability as the samples and
methodologies do not analyze investment treaty disputes or the management
of international conflicts.
233. Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U.
CIN. L. REV. 847, 856–60, 867–70 (1998); see also RISKIN ET AL., supra note 3,
at 808 (suggesting that people are more willing to comply with the law when it
is perceived to be legitimate and deserving of compliance, and the primary aspect of legitimacy is perceived procedural fairness and trust in legal authorities).
234. The empirical research was not conducted in the investment treaty
context and its external validity may therefore be limited. Future studies,
however, might conduct procedural justice research to address this issue.
235. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s
Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 788–95 (2001); see also Stefan
Machura, Introduction: Procedural Justice, Law and Policy, 20 LAW & POL’Y 1,
CEDURAL
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DSD can utilize these elements to enhance legitimacy and
promote procedural justice on multiple levels. First, DSD designers might invite those affected by conflict—investors or
governments and their citizens—to have a voice in creating the
process of resolving disputes. This might advance democratic
values236 and enhance perceived procedural justice.237 Second,
the design that is ultimately created can incorporate disputing
systems that are most likely to provide those parties with
choice and a voice, as well as offering dignity and respect.
Irrespective of whether change is implemented, a transparent evaluation process can strengthen institutional credibility.238 It sends a message that the system is not static. Rather,
it can be open to critique and improvement that enhances quality and improves satisfaction for those directly or indirectly affected by treaty-related conflict. All of these factors are likely to
enhance the credibility of the disputing process and promote its
long-term stability.
B. COSTS
There are, however, potential downsides to using DSD to
resolve investment treaty conflict.
1. Appropriateness of a DSD Model
Some might suggest that using DSD to analyze and select
a dispute resolution process is unnecessary. Rather, because
these critics might believe that only one form of dispute resolution is ever appropriate, DSD would seem an unwarranted
waste of resources. As the boundaries of substantive treaty
3–4, 6–7 (1998) (reviewing empirical research on the effect of procedural justice and observing that parties are more likely to accept unfavorable outcomes
and remain committed to a group if they have participated in the decisions,
the process recognizes their status in the group, and authorities appear to be
neutral and benevolent in application).
236. Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem
of Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 279, 295;
Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in
International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 587, 625–29
(1998).
237. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 208–09 (1988).
238. There is also a benefit “from considering whether there may be more
appropriate ways to resolve disputes. Even if no process is found that can improve the existing structures, the exercise of considering appropriate processes
will still help an organization assess its sources of its conflict, and may lead to
a better understanding of the conflict.” STITT, supra note 43, at 10.
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rights are still being sketched and implicate public policy, taking a page from Owen Fiss’s classic critique,239 these commentators might suggest that mechanisms other than public adjudication are inappropriate.240
This position ignores the possibility that utilization of DSD
methods may result in the creation of a system that only uses
public adjudication. If that were the case, the systematic analysis leading to this recommendation would provide enhanced
public trust in the resulting mechanism. Moreover, a single
dispute resolution mechanism is rarely a silver bullet. Limiting
parties to a single forum may prevent parties from using a mutually satisfactory process to resolve a conflict in a mutually acceptable way.
2. Generalizability of a DSD Model
There may be important challenges related to the generalizability of DSD to manage conflict.241 In particular, there may
be important differences amongst legal cultures, dispute resolution traditions, and economic and political contexts that make
the utilization of DSD approaches untenable or, at a minimum,
more challenging.242 Undoubtedly, cultural, psychological, eco-

239. Fiss, supra note 3, at 1085–90.
240. These advocates might be arbitration rejectors advocating a return of
disputes to public forums. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1594–1601.
241. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in
International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory
and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319, 325 (“Exportation of ADR
techniques and theories must be culturally and politically sensitive to the host
nations or cultures . . . .”); Wallace Warfield, Response to Carrie MenkelMeadow’s “Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic
Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts,” 2003
J. DISP. RESOL. 417, 417–18 (questioning whether Western approaches to conflict resolution are generalizable to other cultures or simply reflect unique,
nontransferable values and methodologies).
242. See JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE
DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 203–09 (2001); Julie Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How
Cultural Values Shape Our Disputing Processes, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 289,
317–20; see also BRISHKAI LUND ET AL., CONFLICT AND CULTURE: REPORT OF
THE MULTICULTURALISM AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROJECT 26–27 (1994)
(discussing the importance of individualist and collectivist dimensions in designing and providing conflict resolution programs or training); Cohen, supra
note 155, at 329–32 (discussing difficulties arising from different dispute resolution traditions and high and low context cultures); Ilhyung Lee, The Law
and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement (With Japan and the
United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 9–13 (2005) (analyzing the im-
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nomic, political, and legal contexts may make the DSD inappropriate in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, thoughtful
consideration of what factors may make DSD unsuitable can be
part of a preliminary diagnosis.
3. The Challenge of Structuring DSD
a. A Few Critical Questions
There will also be challenges related to the specific and
structured application of DSD principles. There will undoubtedly be questions about (1) whether a design should proceed on a
bilateral or multilateral basis, (2) how designers would be selected and paid, (3) who should be involved in the design
process, (4) what are the foundational values for a system’s organization, (5) whether there is an appropriate laboratory for
DSD and how pilot testing might be conducted, (6) what mechanisms will be available for correcting inefficiencies in the new
system, (7) how stakeholders can be educated to maximize the
benefits of the newly designed system, (8) whether there is
something unique about the role of governments or investors in
this context that may inhibit the benefits of DSD, (9) whether
the scope of conflict is large enough to justify using DSD, and
(10) whether the costs of setting up the system would be worth
the eventual benefits.243
These are important questions. Nevertheless, these issues
should not prevent scholars and policymakers from thinking,
discussing, and analyzing the potential benefits of DSD. Instead, these questions are best viewed through a lens that
opens up the possibility for creative experimentation.244

pact of high and low context cultures and the impact of apology on dispute resolution).
243. This is not an exclusive list. Future scholarship might usefully supplement and tease out critical sub-issues related to efficient management of
DSD in the investment treaty context.
244. This is not dissimilar to the potential benefits of experimentation
available through regulatory competition. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional
Linkage: Transcending “Trade And . . . ,” 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 84 (2002)
(“[P]ressure [of regulatory competition] is expected to lead to regulation that is
more efficient, that achieves the regulatory goal at less cost; or perhaps to the
repeal of regulation that does not provide benefits sufficient to justify its
costs.”); Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 63–70 (1993) (explaining that
the benefits of multiple legal regimes in transnational law permit regulatory
experimentation).
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b. Possible Ways Forward
Ultimately DSD can be implemented however stakeholders
wish. That said, one of the most fundamental decisions to be
made is whether DSD should proceed on a multilateral or bilateral basis.245 The answer to this issue is critical as the resulting dispute resolution mechanism(s) may vary significantly depending on that single answer.
i. A Multilateral Approach
A broad, multilateral approach has certain benefits. First,
it would offer a uniform and consistent approach to dispute
resolution, which may decrease the confusion of investors and
governments alike.246 Second, there may be a possibility of affiliating with an established international organization such as
ICSID to provide a central repository to manage claims.247
Third, it offers an opportunity to hear and address a broad constituency of stakeholders.248 Fourth, a multilateral implemen245. There may be additional subtleties that stakeholders wish to consider.
Rather than using DSD to create a generalized conflict management process,
stakeholders may create project- or industry-specific dispute resolution systems.
246. A uniform approach might involve a multilateral treaty based upon
multilateral consultation. Under this approach, all governments would be subjected to the same obligations and they could look at the text of a single
agreement to determine their rights and responsibilities. Some might reasonably view this as an improvement from having to consider the text of multiple
treaties to determine the scope of their rights. Similarly, should they be
granted rights on a multilateral basis, investors need only look towards a single document to determine the scope of their rights. Such clarity has the benefit of streamlining the process of advising investors. Not all investors, however, may view such clarity as an advantage as it may not provide the current
flexibility.
247. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 87–88 (1990); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 41–46 (1995) (discussing the benefit of “adherence” to
established international and institutional norms). The World Bank has a certain status as a critical lending institution to promote economic development
and ICSID likewise has a reputation as a key arbitral institution. See MARTIN
A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE WORLD BANK’S INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA) 2–3 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/84308.pdf; Antonio R. Parra, ICSID and the Rise of
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Will ICSID Be the Leading Arbitration Institution in the Early 21st Century?, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 41, 42–43 (2000).
But see ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, May 16, 2007, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/05-16-07
.htm (indicating that Bolivia is withdrawing from ICSID).
248. Acting on a broad, multilateral basis creates an opportunity to secure
input from a broad group of perspectives including different governments (i.e.,
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tation—which results in the creation of a single treaty or a
DSD Working Group or Advisory Committee249—might be more
efficient than implementing DSD on a treaty-by-treaty basis
and amending around 2500 individual treaties. As a practical
matter, however, a multilateral approach would need to address investment conflict on a global scale. Likewise, it would
need to offer broad solutions to address the mutual needs of
stakeholders with different political, economic, cultural, and legal traditions.
ii. A Bilateral Approach
The costs of a multilateral approach translate into a significant benefit for a bilateral approach. Because it addresses the
lowest common denominators of countries with different traditions, a multilateral approach may create a race to the bottom.
Rather than having the flexibility that comes from a tailormade process, a multilateral approach may ultimately only
create a narrow, rigid, and unrefined range of acceptable options.
A system focused instead on bilateral relationships can actualize the core benefits of DSD. A bilateral approach permits
stakeholders to make an accurate assessment of the appropriateness of DSD. A contextual application of DSD means the
proposed dispute resolution process can account for local variations and needs. This is likely to mean that conflict indigenous
to its disputing system is managed more effectively.
While there may be concerns about the splintering of dispute resolution that a bilateral use of DSD might bring, this
may not prove overwhelming.250 Investors are accustomed to
developing, developed, or transitional economies); different types of investors
(i.e., different industry sectors, financiers, and insurers); and other NGO perspectives. Including an overly large number of constituents may, however,
create a cacophony with off-setting inefficiencies.
249. This might be similar to the NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private
Commercial Disputes, which was an advisory committee established to make
reports and recommendations on the availability, use, and effectiveness of arbitration, mediation, and other procedures for the resolution of private international commercial disputes. See NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 2022; NAFTA
ADVISORY COMM. ON PRIVATE COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, NOVEMBER 1996 REPORT OF THE NAFTA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE COMMERCIAL DISPUTES TO THE NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION app. A (1996), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-ALENA/report12-en.asp.
250. The challenge of fragmentation of dispute resolution systems may
simply be a question of degree that can be addressed by the proper balance between uniformity and diversification. Beyond this, there may be less of a con-
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different processes (both internal and external) for managing
disputes. While variations may prove challenging for governments,251 they retain ultimate control over the degree of dispute resolution uniformity and can even factor the need for uniformity into their DSD process.252
One way to begin using DSD would be to encourage treaty
partners to consider the possibility of DSD opportunities. When
negotiating treaties in the future, governments might include a
specific provision to establish a working group to make DSDrelated recommendations, or at the very minimum, they might
consider establishing a group to consider the utility of the DSD
process. There is precedent for such an approach.253 In particular, the 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) includes an opportunity for treaty partners to consider the possibility of augmenting the existing arbitration mechanism to
provide for an appellate body.254 Such an approach might also
provide for fruitful opportunities to consider dispute resolution
more systematically and create tailor-made mechanisms to address their unique needs.
Many treaties currently in existence have sunset provisions that provide an opportunity for renegotiation of treaty

cern about the fragmentation of the dispute resolution process than there is
with the fragmentation of the underlying substantive standards of investment
protections. Fragmentation concerns may be of particular concern in the substantive arena because diversification in standards are further fragmented by
the sophistry of interpretation by arbitration tribunals.
251. The challenge for governments may be less about managing different
dispute resolution processes and more about becoming accustomed to being
publicly accountable for their conduct. For countries without a tradition of
waiving sovereign immunity, it may be particularly difficult to offer investorstate dispute resolution if there is no internal infrastructure in place—such as
the Office of the Legal Advisor at the United States Department of State—to
defend claims.
252. Governments might consider DSD on a unilateral basis. They might
consider their internal conflicts, needs, and values during the design process.
Theoretically, this might result in internal domestic legislation to improve the
performance of managing investment disputes. See, e.g., Salacuse, supra note
168, at 46–47 (“[H]ost countries might wish to consider enacting legislation
that specifically authorizes—if not encourages—[government officials] to employ ADR techniques.”). It also might involve using DSD to create model treaty language that requires adaptation with each trading partner.
253. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, at Annex D.
254. See id. (“Within three years after the date of entry into force of the
Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate
body or similar mechanism to review awards . . . .”).
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terms in five to ten years.255 Given the increase in the number
of countries renegotiating treaties,256 government negotiators
might consider DSD actively. For those forward planners, governments might contemplate the utility of revising the dispute
resolution provisions to address their current and future interests. Theoretically, the time between now and the sunset may
permit parties to use DSD to agree upon a modified dispute
resolution mechanism that is implemented later.
iii. The Hybrid: A Third Way?
There is a possible “third way” for using DSD. Countries
may ultimately prefer to use a centralized set of models—
perhaps created by a group representing a broad constituency
of stakeholders—but adapt the general approach to meet the
unique needs of each individual system. This may minimize the
likelihood of confusion caused by a plethora of radically different sets of dispute resolution processes but still provide an opportunity for a degree of customization.
As a practical matter, this latter option may be the most
realistic scenario as major capital exporting countries (such as
the United States, The Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and
France) use Model BITs to begin treaty negotiations.257 Nevertheless, the Australia/United States Free Trade Agreement
demonstrates that parties can significantly alter their standard
dispute resolution negotiating strategy should the context warrant it.258
Moreover, to the extent that risk-averse stakeholders wish
to adhere to tried, tested, and generally accepted models, using
a prepackaged DSD model may be more politically tenable.
While there would undoubtedly be variations in the models
adopted, the degree of uniformity coupled with better tailoring
would likely be an improvement to the current approach. A
more uniform approach that allows for reasonable variation
may also prevent over-fragmentation. Such an outcome for a

255. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 6, at 109; LUCY REED ET AL.,
GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 61–62 (2004).
256. See UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, supra note 4, at 2
(“The trend towards the renegotiation of existing treaties has continued with
13 BITs affected in 2005.”).
257. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 167–253 (providing the text
of various model investment treaties).
258. See Dodge, supra note 37, at 22–26 (discussing the Australia/United
States Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA); Franck, supra note 4, at 359–60.
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system experiencing substantial variation in the interpretation
of textually similar rights259 may prove quite useful.
The choice as to which level to implement DSD, however, is
ultimately a matter of government discretion and presumably
an informed exercise of sovereignty. Should governments desire
greater variety in their dispute resolution obligations, they are
at liberty to create it. Likewise, should governments prefer to
trade the benefits of tailor-made dispute resolution for enhanced certainty, they can negotiate that outcome.260
4. Moving Beyond Inertia: A Constituency for Change
Because it is a systematic shift to the conflict management
mindset, there will be costs associated with using DSD. Given
the nature of inertia,261 some force will be required to adjust
the current approach. There may not be a unified constituency
to advocate for change. There may be a perception that the
problems surrounding the investment treaty dispute have
reached neither a cataclysmic stage nor a “mutually hurting
stalemate,” where parties become willing to consider new solutions.262 In other words, until the difficulties with the existing
259. See generally supra notes 11, 80, and accompanying text (discussing
concerns regarding inconsistency and legitimacy in the current dispute resolution system).
260. Drafters may need to draft around “Most Favored Nations” (MFN)
clauses. One arbitral tribunal held that an MFN clause requires importation
of more favorable dispute resolution provisions from other treaties to which
the respondent is a party. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, 16 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 212, 232 (2001), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Maffezini-Jurisdiction-English_001.pdf. Not all tribunals have agreed with
this approach. See Scott Vessel, Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 126–27 (2007). To address
this issue, stakeholders could include clauses that clearly state that MFN provisions do not apply to the dispute resolution mechanism.
261. Newton’s first law of motion is that an object at rest tends to stay at
rest and an object in motion tends to stay in motion with constant velocity unless acted upon by a force. ISAAC NEWTON, THE PRINCIPIA 416 (Univ. of Cal.
Press, 1st ed. 1999) (1687). This law of inertia suggests that some force will be
required to change the present state of affairs. Cf. id.
262. I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1989) (explaining how foreign powers can contribute to
the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa without using military
force); I. William Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments, in CONTEMPORARY PEACEMAKING: CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND PEACE PROCESSES 19, 19–20, 24, 26 (John Darby & Roger MacGinty eds., 2003); I. William Zartman, Timing and Ripeness, in NEGOTIATOR’S
FIELDBOOK, supra note 3, at 143 (explaining the concept of a mutually hurting
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system reach a point that is unbearable for all stakeholders,
the system may not be ripe for the use of Dispute Systems Design.263
a. The Role of Foreign Investors
Critics might argue that investors have largely been happy
with the status quo and immediate access to investment treaty
arbitration.264 Bringing a host government to the table through
arbitration is a powerful tool. Because it has been used successfully in the past to obtain multimillion-dollar awards,265 investors may have little incentive to change the current process.
This position may be shortsighted. Over-reliance on arbitration has its own costs. Some investors have begun to speak
out against the use of arbitration.266 The potentially significant
arbitration costs, for which the parties may ultimately be responsible, undoubtedly affect this concern. In several important
recent arbitration cases, investors have not prevailed and have
stalemate); see also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Day After Tomorrow: What
Happens Once a Middle East Peace Treaty Is Signed?, 6 NEV. L.J. 401, 403
(2006) (discussing Zartman’s theory of ripeness).
263. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 241, at 344–45 (discussing the problem of ripeness in dispute resolution).
264. There is not yet an empirical analysis quantifying investors’ subjective
satisfaction with the arbitration process. Future analysis might consider this
dimension as treaties provide investors with new procedural rights that investors might reasonably perceive as desirable. One study suggested that arbitration has benefits for states and investors. See CLARK, MARTIRE & BARTOLOMEO, INC., ICSID: STAKEHOLDER SURVEY (2004), available at http://www
.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/icsid-client-survey-100904.pdf (surveying parties’ and arbitrators’ views on ICSID, finding favorable ratings for ICSID, and
reporting that 93% of respondents were “likely” to recommend ICSID dispute
resolution in the future); see also Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration, Financial
Markets and Banking Disputes, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 274 n.120 (2003)
(maintaining that, in securities arbitration, investors fare better in arbitration
proceedings than in the courts); Michael M. Moore, International Arbitration
Between States and Foreign Investors—The World Bank Convention, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1966) (suggesting that a history of dissatisfaction with arbitration “is no reason to oppose the creation of facilities for conciliation and
arbitration of investment disputes to which investors may have access”).
265. See, e.g., supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text (describing the
monetary damages in the Argentina cases).
266. For example, Grant Kesler, the former CEO of Metalclad, a company
that won an investment treaty arbitration, was so dissatisfied with the process
that he stated he “wished he had merely entrusted his company’s fate to informal mechanisms,” such as various “political options.” Coe, supra note 78, at
8 & n.2. After having spent approximately five years and approximately $4
million in legal fees, Kesler opined the process was too slow, costly, and indeterminate. Id. at 9–10.
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been required to pay millions of dollars not just for their own
legal costs but also the costs of the government and the arbitral
tribunal.267
Not unlike the situation at the Caney Creek mine, investment treaty arbitration is subject to rising costs and lengthy
delays. Investors might be best served by looking for ways to
address those issues. In other words, there are aspects of the
current system that may not be in an investor’s long-term
commercial interests. DSD could offer an opportunity to accentuate the positive aspects of the current system while minimizing other important commercial risks.
b. The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may also not be
natural advocates. They have made inroads towards increasing
the transparency of the arbitration process and obtaining public access to materials.268 Accordingly, some NGOs may be unwilling to support reform that may decrease transparency if, for
example, DSD results in the implementation of processes that
increase confidentiality.
However, opposition to DSD on the part of NGOs may be
counterproductive to long-term goals.269 In particular, DSD
may give NGOs a voice in the design process. Likewise, a new
design may use processes that promote core NGO policy objectives, such as establishing an ombuds office where citizens and
NGOs have an equal opportunity to voice complaints.270
267. See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, Award (UNCITRAL
Jan.
26,
2006),
available
at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
ThunderbirdAward.pdf (requiring Thunderbird to pay three-fourths (approximately $378,939.06) of the tribunal’s costs and expenses and $1,126,549.38
for the respondent’s legal costs and expenses); Methanex Corp. v. United
States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1464 (2005) (requiring the losing investor to pay
$2,989,423.76 for the United States’ legal costs and also reimburse the United
States for $1,071,539.21 in connection with other arbitration costs); cf. ADC
Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, No. ARB/03/1, Award (ICSID Oct. 2,
2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf
(requiring the respondent to pay “to the Claimants the sum of $7,623,693 in
full satisfaction of both Claimants’ claims for costs and expenses of this arbitration”).
268. See supra note 196 (discussing aspects of improved transparency in
the investment treaty arbitration process); see also 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 29 (outlining various transparency provisions).
269. URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 101–06 (explaining the events that gave
rise to a costly and lengthy dispute between management and the union).
270. See Krent, supra note 224, at 22 (observing that ombuds through their
“interaction with members of the regulated public may help lend legitimacy
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c. The Role of Governments
More importantly, as they are signing treaties and are the
quintessential “repeat players,” governments have not indicated an interest in pursuing DSD. For example, when it redrafted its Model BIT in 2004, the United States government
made certain structural changes.271 It did provide that “the
claimant and respondent should initially seek to resolve the
disputes through consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of nonbinding, third-party procedures.”272 There
were many other useful improvements made to the dispute resolution provisions, but they were made primarily to the arbitra(as well as transparency) to the affairs of government” through their interactions with members of the regulated public); cf. supra note 223 and accompanying text (outlining the implications of an ombuds approach).
271. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 23 (emphasis added). Canada
also amended its model investment treaty. See Agreement Between Canada
and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, http://www
.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf (last visited
Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Canada Model BIT].
272. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 23 (emphasis added).
This was an improvement over Article VI of the 1992 U.S. Model BIT that
provided that the “parties to the dispute should initially seek a resolution
through consultation and negotiation” without specifying how this should
happen; but in any event, after a six-month cooling-off period, parties could
submit their disputes to arbitration. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at
247 (emphasis added). Under both versions, it is unclear what is expected of
the parties during this process of consultation and negotiation.
Recourse to negotiation does not appear to be mandatory. Instead, parties
gain access to arbitration by (1) submitting a notice of intent to submit a claim
and (2) waiting the requisite amount of time to file the arbitration. 2004 U.S.
Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 24(2)–(3). The nature of the obligation to engage in nonbinding dispute resolution in U.S. Model BITs has ebbed and
flowed over time. While the 2004 U.S. Model BIT generally resembles the 1987
U.S. Model BIT language, the 1987 language was slightly stronger. The 1987
U.S. Model BIT required that “parties to the dispute shall initially seek to resolve the dispute by consultation and negotiation, which may include the use
of non-binding third party procedures.” U.S. BIT Model Negotiating Text of
September 1987, art VI(2), reprinted in VANDEVELDE, supra note 217, app. A4. The 1982 version of the treaty provides that “the parties shall initially seek
to resolve the dispute by consultation and negotiation [and] may agree to rely
upon non-binding, third-party procedures, such as the fact-finding facility
available under the Rules of the Additional Facility” of ICSID. U.S. BIT Model
Negotiating Text of January 11, 1982, art. VI(2), reprinted in VANDEVELDE,
supra note 217, app. A-1. By sharp contrast, the April 1994 version of the U.S.
Model BIT did not reference any type of nonbinding dispute resolution; it only
permitted investors to resolve disputes in national tribunals, by previously
agreed methods, and through various arbitration methods. See U.S. Model
BIT, art. IX (Apr. 1994), reprinted in UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM VOL. III at 201, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTC/30,
U.N. Sales No. E.96.II.A.11 (1996).
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tion process.273 More importantly, there is no known evidence
regarding whether the United States considered DSD systematically.274
Governments may not be considering DSD for a variety of
reasons. Some countries may not see a need to change. This
may be due to practical realities, namely that their investors
benefit from the current regime and their government has not
had to absorb any of the costs of investment treaty arbitration
because they have not (1) lost a case or (2) had to pay for the
defense of a treaty claim.275 Other governments that have been
regularly subjected to treaty claims and have had to pay the
price—such as Argentina, the Czech Republic, and the
Ukraine—may not have the bargaining power to change the
status quo.276
Basic reasons might explain the failure of governments to
engage in DSD. Government officials may simply be unaware of
DSD. Similarly, for those governments which have not used it
in the past, there may be some skepticism as to its potential
benefits or a lack of understanding of how it might be used in
the framework of investor-state dispute resolution provisions of
a treaty. Moreover, given the challenges of making changes
within bureaucracies,277 inertia may prevent governmental
change until a tipping point has been reached.278
Despite these concerns, there are social, economic, and political costs of doing nothing. Engineers practicing Total Quality Control279 recognize that all systems have costs, including
273. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT gave tribunals the authority to accept amicus curiae submissions, address preliminary questions, expand the transparency of arbitration proceedings, and consolidate claims. The 2004 Model BIT
also considers the possibility of an appellate mechanism. 2004 U.S. Model BIT,
supra note 19, arts. 28(3)–(4), 29, 33, Annex D.
274. Canada Model BIT, supra note 271, arts. 22–27, 32–39 (providing for
consultation before the initiation of arbitration, introducing other improvements to the arbitration system, but apparently failing to include DSD).
275. See, e.g., Gottwald, supra note 195, at 253 n.80 (“[The] United States
has faced nine different investment treaty arbitration claims brought under
NAFTA’s investment chapter, but has not lost a claim to date.”).
276. See supra notes 10, 193, 206, and accompanying text.
277. Cf. PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY
AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 64 (1995) (arguing that the link between thickening government and the diffusion of accountability expresses itself in associated costs, including information distortion, administrative inertia, and disunity of command).
278. See NEWTON, supra note 261, at 416.
279. Total Quality Control is a “comprehensive, companywide system” to
achieve the goal of “provid[ing] a product and service into which quality is de-
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those for planning, appraisal, implementation, and failure.280
Nevertheless, creating an effective high-quality system is well
worth the effort if it eliminates other costs related to the creation of a poor quality product that may serve as the basis of future complaint.281
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to articulate the case for
using DSD to analyze and manage investment-related conflict.
This preliminary step is fundamental to providing a constituency and platform for dialogue about DSD in order to supply a
framework for its ultimate implementation. It is, however, only
one step in a larger process.
It is imperative to engage in systems analysis to diagnose
the investment treaty-related conflict and where the dispute
resolution processes succeed and fail. Such an assessment
might involve both quantitative and qualitative empirical analysis to understand the macro- and microimplications for future
dispute resolution processes.282 In addition, it is vital to gather
a constituency to agree on the core set of organizing principles.
Bringing together states and investors, as well as international
and non-governmental organizations, to create a dialogue may
well prove a daunting task. This vital step is worth the effort
because it could lead to a consensus on the appropriate framework for the creation of future dispute resolution systems. It
might, for example, determine whether predictability or fragmentation should be guiding principles of the system.
Finally, governments might ultimately use the foregoing
information and analysis to make innovations in or adaptations
of their current processes for resolving investment treaty conflicts. Because not all governments are likely to accept this
DSD-based approach to conflict management immediately,283 it
signed, built, marketed, and maintained at the most economical costs which
allow for full customer satisfaction.” A.V. FEIGENBAUM, TOTAL QUALITY CONTROL 5 (3d ed. 1991).
280. See generally BILL CREECH, THE FIVE PILLARS OF TQM: HOW TO MAKE
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT WORK FOR YOU (1994); FEIGENBAUM, supra
note 279.
281. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 279; JURAN’S QUALITY HANDBOOK, supra
note 120, at 8.1–8.25.
282. Quantitative analysis might include, for example, the use of regression modeling or other statistical techniques to analyze large bodies of data
related to particular populations.
283. Everett Rogers’s classic book on the theory of diffusion of innovations
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will be critical for governments that are perhaps more comfortable with experimentation and more familiar with DSD to innovate and provide an example of the costs and benefits of the
approach.284 While innovation and diffusion are likely to be
challenging, completion of the DSD process requires such design, implementation, and assessment of the design. Based
upon the success of such innovators, there may be diffusion
that encourages more risk-averse governments to use DSD in
the future.
The challenge is to think seriously about designing comprehensive systems to resolve investment disputes. This requires consideration not just of traditional binding mechanisms, but of a system that may involve a combination of both
binding and nonbinding processes.
We are at a unique historical junction in the evolution of
resolving investment-related conflict. Arbitration will no doubt
be an important part of the puzzle. Nevertheless, taking a more
systematic approach to conflict management provides an opportunity to assess and capitalize on the efficiency of different dispute resolution options. Such an approach should include ongoing scholarship and should address the issues identified in this
preliminary work. The approach might also enhance the integrity and legitimacy of the current dispute resolution system.
As with any new venture, there will undoubtedly be challenges involved in integrating DSD into the world of investment treaty conflict. The goal should be to brainstorm possible
opportunities before throwing the baby out with the proverbial
bathwater. The opportunity to decrease costs, increase efficiency, and interject procedural justice into the system should not
be discounted. Ultimately, such an analysis has the unique
benefit of strengthening the legitimacy of the dispute resolution
argues that the adopters of any new innovation or idea could be categorized as
“innovators” (2.5 percent), “early adopters” (13.5 percent), “early majority” (34
percent), “late majority” (34 percent), and “laggards” (16 percent), based on
bell curve mathematic distribution. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 11 (4th ed. 1995). The willingness and ability to adopt an innovation
can depend on awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption. See id. at 1
(“Getting a new idea adopted, even when it has obvious advantages, is often
very difficult. Many innovations require a lengthy time, often of many years,
from the time they become available to the time they are widely adopted.”);
GLADWELL, supra note 49, at 197 (discussing the “New Product Cycle” and the
role of “innovators” in encouraging people to adapt to new ideas).
284. Given its history of ADR and DSD and the ongoing debate about the
Trade Promotion Authority Act, the United States is well positioned to consider the use of DSD.
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process and giving stakeholders confidence in the system’s capacity to protect their rights, satisfy their interests, and produce just results.

